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ABSTRACT 
China’s growing economic dynamism has made it a powerful actor in the 
globalized economy. Continued growth of China’s economy requires guaranteed sea 
access to foreign energy resources and markets. In response to the need for sea access, 
the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is 
undergoing an expansion and force modernization process intended to ensure China’s 
access to vital sea lines of communications (SLOCs). In recent history, post-Meiji 
Restoration Japan and early twentieth century Germany provide two examples of the 
impact of rising economic powers with expansive maritime strategies. In both cases, 
efforts by regional competitors to maintain relatively superior naval forces led to 
heightened tensions and, ultimately, war. Through the unintended promotion of regional 
naval arms races, both the Empire of Japan and the German Empire contributed to the 
destabilization of their respective region’s security.  
This thesis argues that, based on the historical record of competitive naval growth, 
an expanding PLAN will destabilize East Asia as China challenges the dominance of the 
leading naval power in the Western Pacific – the United States Navy. However, China’s 
rise differs from the rise of Japan and Germany in important ways. Diplomatic efforts by 
Washington and Beijing to identify shared maritime interests can serve to alleviate the 
destabilizing effects associated with naval growth. Additionally, security tensions 
associated with naval arms races may be mitigated through a thorough U.S. analysis of 
the actual threat posed by China’s growing naval power. 
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. PURPOSE.........................................................................................................1 
B. RELEVANCE TO U.S. FOREIGN POLICY ...............................................1 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW ...............................................................................2 
D. METHODOLOGY ..........................................................................................5 
II.  CHINA’S NAVAL MODERNIZATION...................................................................7 
A. CHINA’S ECONOMY ....................................................................................7 
1. Economic Growth, 1978-2007.............................................................8 
2. Current Economic Drivers..................................................................9 
3. Areas of Concern................................................................................10 
B. CHINA’S ENERGY CONCERNS ...............................................................11 
1. Energy Use..........................................................................................11 
2. Energy Acquisition ............................................................................12 
3. Energy Security..................................................................................13 
C. CHINESE MILITARY THOUGHT............................................................16 
1. Patterns in Chinese Military Thought .............................................16 
2. Chinese Military Thought in the Time of Mao ...............................19 
3. Contemporary Chinese Military Thought.......................................21 
D. MARITIME STRATEGY AND THE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION 
ARMY NAVY.................................................................................................23 
1. A Summary of Maritime Strategy....................................................23 
2. Sir Julian Corbett and Alfred Thayer Mahan ................................24 
a. Corbett and Chinese Naval Thought......................................28 
b. Mahan and Chinese Naval Thought ......................................29 
E. THE MODERNIZATION OF THE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION 
ARMY NAVY.................................................................................................33 
1. Liu Huaqing, Offshore Active Defense, and the String of Pearls..34 
2. Force Modernization .........................................................................37 
a. Force Structure .......................................................................37 
b. Budget......................................................................................38 
c. The Fleet..................................................................................41 3
3. Matching Means and Ends – The Purpose of the Modern 
PLAN...................................................................................................45 
III.  THE RISE OF THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE NAVY, 1868-1941........................49 
A. MEIJI RESTORATION ...............................................................................50 
1. Pre-Meiji Restoration ........................................................................50 
2. After the Meiji Restoration...............................................................51 
3. The Role of National Unity................................................................52 
B. JAPAN’S GEO-POLITICAL OUTLOOK, LATE NINETEENTH  – 
EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURIES .........................................................53 
1. The Drive for National Strength.......................................................53 
 viii
a. Economic Concerns of Modernization...................................54 
b. Initial Naval Modernization ...................................................55 
2. Foreign Policy.....................................................................................57 
a. East Asia..................................................................................57 
b. The West ..................................................................................58 
C. MATCHING ENDS AND MEANS: CHOOSING A STRATEGY...........61 
1. Japan’s Options..................................................................................61 
a. Treaties and Naval Arms Limitations ....................................62 
b. Mahan......................................................................................65 
c. Resources, World War I, and Economic Necessity................66 
D. IMPACT OF AN EXPANDING MARITIME STRATEGY.....................68 
1. Internal Influences .............................................................................68 
a. Army vs. Navy Politics ............................................................68 
b. Economics and Expenditures .................................................70 
2. External Influences and Effects........................................................72 
a. China and Japan’s International Relations ..........................72 
b. The United States Navy...........................................................75 
E. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................79 
IV.  THE RISE OF THE IMPERIAL GERMAN NAVY, 1871-1914 ..........................81 
A. GERMAN UNIFICATION...........................................................................82 
1. Pre-German Unification....................................................................82 
2. Post-German Unification...................................................................83 
3. The Role of Nationalism ....................................................................84 
B. GERMANY’S GEO-POLITICAL OUTLOOK, LATE 
NINETEENTH CENTURY ..........................................................................85 
1. The Drive for Great Power Status....................................................85 
a. Economic Concerns of Modernization...................................86 
b. Political Concerns of Modernization .....................................87 
2. Military Modernization.....................................................................89 
C. MATCHING ENDS AND MEANS: CHOOSING A STRATEGY...........90 
1. Models of Maritime Strategy ............................................................90 
a. Jeune Ecole (the “Young School”) ........................................91 
b. Mahan......................................................................................92 
c. Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz and Risk Theory .........................93 
2. Germany’s Choice..............................................................................94 
D. IMPACT OF AN EXPANDING MARITIME STRATEGY.....................96 
1. The German Navy Laws of 1898 and 1900......................................96 
2. Internal Effects...................................................................................97 
a. Public Opinion and Morale ....................................................97 
b. Economics ...............................................................................98 
3. External Effects..................................................................................99 
a. Alliances and Great Power Politics ........................................99 
b. The Royal Navy .....................................................................101 
E. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................103 
V.  CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................105 
 ix
A. PAST AS PROLOGUE ...............................................................................105 
1. Themes from History – The Dangers of Growth ..........................105 
a. Signaling................................................................................105 
b. Economic Self-Interest .........................................................106 
c. The Ideology of Prestige .......................................................107 
d. Goliath Defeats David: The Futility of the Underdog in a 
Naval Arms Race...................................................................108 
2. Mapping the Past to the Present – China and Themes from 
History...............................................................................................109 
a. Similarities.............................................................................109 
b. Differences ............................................................................110 
c. Summary................................................................................112 
B. THE FUTURE OF ASIAN SECURITY STABILITY .............................112 
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE UNITED 
STATES NAVY............................................................................................114 
BIBLIOGRAPHY................................................................................................................119 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .......................................................................................129 
 
 x
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 xi
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. China’s Critical Sea Lanes...............................................................................14 
Figure 2. The First and Second Island Chains.................................................................36 




 THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
The author would like to thank the tireless efforts of the many professionals at the 
Naval Postgraduate School who spent countless hours teaching, guiding, and mentoring 
me throughout this process. Special thanks go to my advisors, Dr. Alice Miller and Dr. 
Daniel Moran, for their specific guidance and counsel concerning this thesis. 
My deepest gratitude goes to my wife, Veronique, who has supported my 
countless hours of study and work. Her love and support have anchored me throughout 
my time at the Naval Postgraduate School. It is no understatement to say that none of this 
would have been possible without her. I can only hope that the work I have done will 
make her and our new daughter, Gabriella, proud of their husband and father.  
 xiv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 1
I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE 
Recently, a great deal of attention has been given to the rise of China. Most 
notably, China’s growing economic dynamism has made it a powerful actor in the 
globalized economy. Continued growth of China’s economy requires secure access to 
foreign energy resources. In response to this need, the People’s Liberation Army Navy 
(PLAN) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is undergoing an expansion and force 
modernization process that is intended to ensure China has access to energy resources via 
well-guarded sea lines of communications (SLOCs). The overall nature and impact of 
China’s expanding maritime strategy remains unknown. In recent history, post-Meiji 
Restoration Japan and late-nineteenth/early-twentieth century Germany provide two 
historical examples of the impact of rising economic powers with expansive maritime 
strategies. A review of both case studies will assist in assessing the potential 
ramifications of China’s expanding maritime strategy for regional and global strategy. 
B. RELEVANCE TO U.S. FOREIGN POLICY  
Throughout the world, the United States guarantees the freedom of the seas. That 
guarantee ensures open access to energy resources that fuel modern economies, as well as 
the free exchange of the finished goods those economies create. Toward that end, the 
United States has developed the most technologically capable navy in the world. Capable 
of operations worldwide, no other navy challenges the dominance of the United States 
Navy (USN) on the high seas. However, some analysts see a growing PLAN as a 
potential threat to the USN’s dominance in the Western Pacific and beyond. In order to 
accurately assess the nature and degree of threat that the PLAN presents to the USN, it is 
necessary to take into account both the reasons behind China’s drive to establish a more 
capable navy and the potential ramifications of a larger PLAN for Asian security. Once 
the driving interests behind the PLAN’s modernization are understood, American policy-
makers and strategic planners will be better equipped to devise an appropriate response.  
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For the USN, the key area of concern is how to respond to the PLAN’s increased 
force structure. Historically, two periods in modern history demonstrate the effects of the 
expansion of a rising power’s naval force structure alongside that of the navy of a 
geopolitically dominant state – post-Meiji Japan and the Second German Reich. An 
analysis of the rise of the Imperial Japanese Navy prior to World War II and the rise of 
the Imperial German Navy prior to World War I will present general themes that occur 
over the course of significant naval arms expansions.  
How United States foreign policy makers and the USN respond to China’s naval 
expansion will have a significant impact on Washington’s role in East Asian geopolitics 
for the next several decades. Careful analysis of the issue is necessary to avoid potential 
security-pitfalls.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Along with the economic and political aspects of national power, the military 
dimension of the rise of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is a topic of great 
speculation and, more often than not, concern. In particular, the People’s Liberation 
Army Navy (PLAN) stands out as a highly dynamic sector of the Chinese military. 
Current trends indicate that the Chinese naval fleet will surpass the world’s largest navy, 
that of the United States, in number of vessels by 2015.1 Discernable motivations for 
China’s continued naval modernization range from the desire to establish PRC 
domination of Taiwan via military force to the capacity to guard offshore energy and 
sovereignty issues. Of key interest to the United States is the fact that, “observers believe 
that broader…goals of China’s military modernization…include…defending China’s 
claim in maritime territorial disputes…(and) protecting China’s sea lines of 
communication (SLOCs)…”2 Both maritime territorial disputes and the protecting of 
SLOCs highlight a key consideration for Chinese policy makers: “…transport by sea is 
                                                 
1 Ronald O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities – 
Background and Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 12 July 2007), 1.  
The number of vessels in a navy is not necessarily the best measure of its capability, however.  The Soviet 
navy was far larger than that of the United States during the last years of the Cold War. 
2 Ibid., 25. 
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China’s most viable mode of energy supply.”3 In light of that fact, some Chinese 
strategists have argued for increased funding of the PLAN because “access to the sea (is) 
an indispensable condition and decisive factor for China’s rise.”4 One source notes that 
naval modernization is a direct reflection of the Chinese leadership’s awareness that over 
80 percent of China’s oil imports pass through the Malacca Straits – a chokepoint where 
the Chinese have no tangible military presence and are unable to guarantee freedom of 
the seas.5 The available literature on the PLAN indicates that the PRC is intent on 
expanding the size and operational sphere of the PLAN. Looking at the causes and effects 
of previous naval force expansions by regionally rising powers will provide a longer 
perspective from which the PLAN’s expansion and modernization may be better 
understood. 
Following the Meiji Restoration of 1868, the leaders of Japan inaugurated a 
concerted program of modernization and industrialization that revolutionized the country. 
A common theme in the literature on the rise of Japan’s navy notes that, along with the 
economic growth of Imperial Japan, “(t)he Imperial Japanese Navy was…emblematic of 
the rise of Japan as a world power.”6 Within decades of embarking on modernization, 
Japan had the third largest navy in the world. Literature that outlines why Japan’s navy 
grew so quickly is not as abundant as sources that outline how the navy grew. However, 
the available literature agrees that there were both economic and political justifications 
for the navy’s growth. Once source notes that the Japanese navy “secured and defended 
Japan’s colonial interests and demonstrated to the world that Japan had emerged as a 
modern industrial power.”7 Economically, colonial interests provided essential raw 
materials for the Japanese economy, while the international respect garnered from the 
                                                 
3 Christopher J. Pehrson, String of Pearls: Meeting the Challenge of China’s Rising Power Across the 
Asian Littoral (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2006), 7 
4 Ibid., 7. 
5 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2007 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007), 8. 
6 David C Evans and Mark R. Peattie, Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial 
Japanese Navy, 1887-1941 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997), xx. 
7 J. Charles Schencking, Making Waves: Politics, Propaganda, and the Emergence of the Imperial 
Japanese Navy, 1868-1922 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), 223. 
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Imperial Japanese Navy’s defeat of both Chinese and Russian forces around the turn of 
the twentieth century served Japan’s political objective of regional power and influence.8 
The success of Japan’s naval expansion had a notable impact on one peer competitor’s 
naval forces. By 1906, the United States Navy had drawn up its official War Plan Orange 
– a detailed plan of how to counter Japanese aggression in the Western Pacific, which 
shaped American naval strategy for over thirty years.9 Overall, the connection between 
post-Meiji Japan’s industrialization and naval expansion is supported by numerous 
secondary sources, as is the impact of naval expansion upon one of Japan’s peer 
competitors, the United States.  
The rise of the Imperial German Navy at the turn of the twentieth century is well 
covered by secondary sources. Already a powerful industrial force, Germany made a 
decision in 1884 to pursue overseas colonies. Colonies would serve as “markets for goods 
and sources of raw material.”10 Several sources note that Germany’s naval establishment 
assessed Germany’s geographic position as poorly suited for maintaining security of 
trade via SLOCs.11 Although the Royal Navy of Britain provided maritime security 
worldwide, the rise of the Imperial German Navy is widely viewed as an attempt to 
“protect German merchant shipping…and guarantee unimpeded passage to the 
oceans…”12 Several sources identify Germany’s expansive naval strategy as a key 
component in the escalation of tensions between Britain and Germany prior to World 
War I. One source specifically notes that, coupled with Germany’s economic might and 
nationalism, “…the growing German navy represented a potential hegemonic threat and a 
cause for concern over the Reich’s intentions.”13 Overall, there exists a significant body 
                                                 
8 Evans and Peattie, 135. 
9 Sadao Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: The Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States 
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006), 23. 
10 Robert K Massie, Dreadnought: Britain, Germany, and the Coming of the Great War (New York, 
NY: Ballantine Books, 1991), 85. 
11 Rolf Hobson, Imperialism at Sea: Naval Strategic Thought, the Ideology of Sea Power, and the 
Tirpitz Plan, 1875-1914 (Boston, MA: Brill Academic Publishers, Inc., 2002), 123-125, and James R. 
Holmes, “Mahan, a ‘Place in the Sun,’ and Germany’s Quest for Sea Power.” Comparative Strategy 23 
(2004): 45-46. 
12 Massie, xxiv. 
13 Hobson, 326. 
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of material from which to evaluate the historical case study of Germany’s naval 
expansion and the expansion’s impact on regional powers. 
For United States maritime strategy, the problems of the present may take counsel 
from the lessons of history. The importance of these lessons directly connects to the 
question of how the United States should respond to China’s expansive maritime 
strategy. A common question in the literature is, “how does an existing hegemon manage 
a rising power?”14 Although not yet a global power, “China’s offshore national security 
concerns…are problems whose resolution will require the ability to prevail in a maritime 
environment.”15 While the PLAN is now only a regional force, the fact that several 
sources note its developing orientation towards an “offshore active defense”16 raises 
questions regarding how the PLAN intends to interact with the dominant maritime power 
in the region, the United States Navy. The available literature addresses the issue of how 
the United States can best respond to the changing geopolitical reality of naval strength in 
the Western Pacific. A review of historical precedent will help answer the question of the 
United States’ best response to the expansion of the PLAN. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
In order to review historical precedent, this thesis’s primary methodology is 
comparative historical case studies. While the historical case studies rely mostly on 
secondary sources, official government documents and primary sources are utilized 
where available.   
The first case study focuses on the growth of the Imperial Japanese Navy in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The response of rival powers, notably the 
United States, is reviewed. A second case study focuses on the growth of the Imperial 
German Navy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. The response of the 
United Kingdom’s Royal Navy highlights the regional impact of Germany’s naval 
                                                 
14 Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes, “Command of the Sea with Chinese Characteristics.” Orbis 49, 
no. 4 (2005): 691. 
15 Bernard Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy Enters the 21st Century (Annapolis, MD: Naval 
Institute Press, 2001), 9. 
16 Ibid., 166, and Yoshihara and Holmes, 681. 
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expansion. Both case studies address the ambitions, restrictions, and limitations, both 
external and internal, that growing maritime powers face. Ultimately, the historical record 
of how successful growing navies were able to integrate with regional peers provides 
historical lessons that may be applied to potential present and future naval competition 
between China and the United States. 
Alongside case study analyses, this thesis will consider the more general role that 
maritime strategy plays as an instrument for pursuing broader national interests, and 
especially economic interests, which have always been a particular focus of maritime 
power. In the end, the ability of China’s maritime strategy to serve its national interests 
without antagonizing regionally powerful actors will serve as a measure of geopolitical 
success or failure.   
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II.  CHINA’S NAVAL MODERNIZATION 
The rise of China covers several facets of state power and prestige. Foremost 
among China’s strengths is its economy. Along with its economy, China has cultivated 
diplomatic relationships with numerous powers in both the developed and developing 
world. Finally, China’s military strength is a topic of considerable speculation for both its 
current strength and the direction of its developments. The combined economic, 
diplomatic, and military strength of China reveal the country’s considerable power, as 
well as its likely position of dominance within East Asia in the near future.  
China’s rise raises several issues regarding its place in the international 
community. Specifically, as China’s political, economic, and military power increases, 
the way in which other countries respond will define the course of international politics 
for years to come. Of particular concern to the United States is the growth of the Chinese 
People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), whose growth has coincided with, and is 
dependent upon, that of its economy.  
A. CHINA’S ECONOMY 
The growth of China’s economy within the past 30 years has been nothing short 
of remarkable. Between 1978 and 2005, China’s economy has averaged 10 percent 
growth of its gross domestic product (GDP).17 By 2006, when measured utilizing market 
exchange rates, by 2006 the consistently high rate of growth resulted in China becoming 
the world’s fourth largest economy. When measured by purchasing power parity (PPP), 
China’s economy ranks second only to the United States.18 To understand how the 
Chinese economy has grown and expanded at such a rapid rate, it is necessary to look at 
both how the economy developed since the late 1970s, and how the economy interacts 
                                                 
17 See Susan L. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007), 
19, and Barry Naughton, The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth (Cambridge, MA: The MIT 
Press, 2007), 3. 
18 World Bank, “World Development Indicators Database,” WorldBank.org (14 September 2007) 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdf and 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP_PPP.pdf (accessed 7 November 
2007). 
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with the greater global economy. Finally, concerns that stem from China’s current 
condition will highlight the economic area that most impacts China’s naval policy – 
energy. 
1. Economic Growth, 1978-2007 
In the late 1970s China had a per capita GDP characteristic of low-income 
countries. With industry accounting for 44 percent of the country’s economic output, 
China had the industrial capacity of a medium-income country.19 The net effect was a 
country that was over-industrialized and failing to service the more modest needs of the 
still largely agrarian populace. To counter that failure, in 1978, the leadership in Beijing 
began a process of economic restructuring. Limited use of market liberalization for 
farmers was introduced gradually across the countryside. In line with capitalist theories 
of production, entrepreneurs produced more for the market once they realized they could 
keep and reinvest profits from excess grain sales.20 Such policies were cautiously 
expanded to towns and villages. Restructuring was combined with limited efforts by 
Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping to open special economic zones to external investment 
and trade. The result was an inflow of capital coupled with reduced interference by 
central planners. Together, the capital inflow and reduced state-interference promoted 
increased manufacturing and export of goods as tools of economic growth.  Between 
1978 and 2001, China’s foreign trade volume increased twenty-five times in volume.21 
More importantly for China, its status as a world power has risen as its share of world 
GDP has grown. From a low of 4.5 percent of world economic activity in 1950, by 2005, 
the Chinese economy accounted for 15.4 percent of the world’s economic output.22 
Clearly, the 30 years since 1978 have proven fruitful for a Chinese economy striving to 
recover from the doldrums of Communist-Party-driven state planning. 
                                                 
19 Naughton, 9. 
20 Naughton, 89-90. 
21 Shirk, 19. 
22 David M. Lampton, “The Faces of Chinese Power,” Foreign Affairs 86, no. 1 (January/February 
2007): 117. 
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2. Current Economic Drivers  
What is most striking about China’s economy today is its dependence on exports. 
Since 1990 investment in productive capacity has been greater than domestic Chinese 
demand for products, and the logical result has been the exporting of goods 
manufactured, but not consumed, within China.23 Between 1994 and 2004, export totals 
grew at a rate of 17 percent per year. The net effect was to expand the value of Chinese 
exports from $100 billion to $593 billion.24 By 2006, the total value of exports was $969 
billion with a $177.6 trade surplus.25 Up to 75 percent of China’s GDP is due to foreign 
trade.26 This fact indicates the importance of two key factors. First, in a reversal of the 
policies stressed by Mao, Beijing has become a firm supporter of international economic 
regimes. Although still wary of global institutions after its international isolation 
following the 1989 Tiananmen Incident, Beijing has learned to recognize the economic 
benefits of international regimes that require all powers, including the United States, to 
operate by agreed upon rules and guidelines.27 Second, China’s export-driven economy 
requires extremely high levels of capital investment. In order to maintain 10 percent 
growth, recent trends indicate that 35 to 40 percent of GDP must be reinvested.28 China’s 
level of reinvested GDP, approximately 10 percent higher than that of other East Asian 
nations, indicates inefficient capital investment. Overall, China’s high growth requires a 
high level of all inputs (capital, labor, and primary commodities) to ensure a high level of 
output. With inefficiency haunting the financial sector, and a reliance upon continued 
external demand, China’s economy is constrained by the very restructuring that allowed 
it to grow to the size it is today. 
                                                 
23 David Dollar, “China’s Economic Problems [and Ours],” The Milken Institute Review (September 
2005): 50. 
24 Dwight H. Perkins, “China’s Recent Economic Performance and Future Prospects,” Asian 
Economic Policy Review 1 (2006): 34. 
25 Wayne M. Morrison, China’s Economic Conditions (Washington, DC: Congressional Research 
Service, 9 August 2007), 9. 
26 Shirk, 24. 
27 Michael Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific (NewYork, NY: RoutledgeCurzon 
Press, 2004), 283. 
28 David Dollar and Shang-Jin Wei, “Underutilized Capital,” Finance and Development 44, no. 2 
(June 2007): 30. 
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3. Areas of Concern 
Beijing has two primary areas of concern with the Chinese economy. The first 
involves the social stability that is challenged by economic forces. The success of 
privately-owned and export-oriented manufacturing has challenged the validity of state-
owned enterprises (SOEs). As the state has sold thousands of inefficient factories, 
millions of workers have been added to the rolls of the unemployed.29 Coupled with the 
weakness of China’s financial system, which has contributed to poor reinvestment 
efficiency and continues to loan money to poorly performing SOEs, Beijing finds itself 
highly reliant upon the export markets in order to ensure the economic growth necessary 
to offset the negative trends from the relics of the state-planned system, the SOEs.  
The second area of concern involves energy. Beginning in 1990, China’s oil 
imports climbed at a rate of 30 percent annually; by 2004, that rate of growth made China 
the second largest consumer of petroleum products in the world.30 China’s use of energy 
is relatively inefficient.  The economy must expend three times the amount of energy the 
U.S. economy expends to expand GDP by one dollar.31 China will require more and more 
energy, particularly petroleum products, in order to fuel the continued growth of its 
manufacturing-intensive, export-oriented economy. Varying estimates hold that between 
2025 and 2030, China will import up to nearly three-fourths of its then approximately 14 
million barrels-per-day (bpd) consumption.32  
How and where that oil is acquired will have a significant impact on China’s 
future economic and political relations. With an economy that direly needs access to 
export markets and available energy resources, it is important to fully analyze the energy 
concerns of China in order to place its naval policy within a fully coherent economic and 
security context. 
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B. CHINA’S ENERGY CONCERNS 
China is currently the second largest consumer of energy in the world. Despite 
relatively low per-capita energy use, only one-seventh that of the United States, China 
will surpass the United States as the largest user of energy within a few decades.33 As a 
net importer of energy since 1996,34 China’s concerns regarding projected future use, 
acquisition, and security are central to framing the context within which Beijing views its 
energy requirements. 
1. Energy Use 
The largest source of energy for modern China is coal. The United States 
Department of Energy estimates that, in 2002, 64.6 percent of China’s net energy 
consumption was in coal, while only 24.5 percent of consumption was in oil.35 With the 
second largest estimated coal reserves in the world, Beijing has pushed coal production to 
the point where China is the largest producer and consumer of coal in the world.36 While 
China’s coal supply is securely under the control of the regime in Beijing, the source of 
oil presents the regime with a serious issue regarding reliance upon the global markets. 
China’s demand for energy has expanded significantly since it first became a net oil 
importer in 1993; as of 2006, 47 percent of oil used within China was imported, most of 
it via sea-lines-of-communication (SLOCs).37 Access to oil will define China’s 
interaction with both world energy markets and foreign governments for the next few 
decades. 
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China’s need for oil imports has made it a major powerhouse in world energy 
markets; between 2002 and 2006, China accounted for over 40 percent of the world’s 
demand growth in oil.38 According to the United States Energy Information Agency, the 
current rate of 47 percent of oil sourced from imports will rise to 77 percent by 2025.39 
Although oil is but one-fourth of China’s energy source, highly inefficient Chinese 
industries will require as much energy as they may acquire to sustain China’s growth. 
Because of that, the energy sector that consists of oil is fundamental to the security of 
China’s expanding economy.  
2. Energy Acquisition 
To guarantee continued growth, China must ensure that it can continually acquire 
the energy required for economic expansion. With coal, China is fortunate to have a large 
enough internal supply to comfortably isolate itself from international coal markets. Oil, 
however, presents a different challenge. One avenue utilized by state-owned Chinese oil 
companies, to include the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and China 
Petroleum and Chemical Corporation, or Sinopec, is to develop partnerships with foreign 
companies. Partnership with, and partial ownership of, foreign companies is seen as 
necessary to both successfully integrate Chinese oil corporations into the world economy 
and to strengthen an indigenously weak energy sector.40  Another avenue pursued by 
Beijing is to court countries that are shunned by the international community due to 
human rights issues and unfavorable regimes. Currently, China receives 20 percent of its 
oil imports from Sudan and Iran, two countries marked by the United States and the 
greater international community as regimes requiring either overhaul or replacement.41 
Finally, China pursues a policy that any savvy businessman would in order to minimize 
risk – it diversifies its resource locations. In 2004, 45.4 percent of China’s oil imports 
arrived from the Middle East, 28.7 arrived from Africa, 14.3 from Russia and Western 
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Hemisphere nations, and 11.5 percent arrived from the Asia-Pacific region.42 Beijing is 
currently looking at the Russian Far East and Central Asian nations for possible 
development of advanced oil pipelines that could transport larger percentages of oil than 
those currently received.43 
What is most striking about China’s oil acquisition is the amount that arrives from 
the sea. China is heavily dependent upon critical sea lanes for its energy imports; 
approximately 80 percent of China’s crude oil imports transit the Straits of Malacca (See 
Figure 1).44 Additionally, although 90 percent of China’s domestic oil production is 
onshore, recent discoveries of oil reserves have been offshore. Finally, with its 1992 Law 
of the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, China claimed sovereignty over almost 
the whole of the South China Sea; this claim simultaneously lays claim to an estimated  
28 billion barrels of oil while contending the claims of Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, the 
Philippines, and Indonesia.45 For China, the question of energy security is a question of 
petroleum imports. Petroleum imports raise further questions of sovereignty and maritime 
access that are the primary concerns of China’s energy policy. 
3. Energy Security 
China has made a significant effort to utilize “soft power” to ensure its energy 
access. As partially outlined above, a significant aspect of that effort has been the 
inclusion of foreign corporations into Chinese efforts to extract and import oil. One 
perspective regarding China’s use of foreign companies, particularly U.S. companies, is 
that any international crisis between Beijing and another nation would involve citizens of 
the foreign power working on Chinese rigs in international waters.  Attempts to extract 
their citizens would place countries in direct conflict with China’s on-scene military 
force, likely the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). 46  
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Figure 1.   China’s Critical Sea Lanes.47 
 
Domestic policy makers in Beijing have encouraged state-owned oil corporations 
to secure exclusive exploration and supply contracts with states that produce petroleum 
products. At the same time, Beijing has courted the governments of these countries with 
foreign aid, infrastructure development, and debt forgiveness.48 As outlined above, often 
the countries that receive this attention are countries marginalized by the international 
community and the United States in particular; Beijing’s courting therefore places it in 
opposition to Washington’s interests. When Washington’s interests are matched with 
those of the American business community, China may pay a price for its expansion. In 
2005, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) effort to purchase Unocal, 
a California-based company, led to inquiries and denunciations from American political 
and business interest. CNOOC withdrew its offer and Unocal was purchased for a lower 
bid by American-based Chevron-Texaco. To Beijing, the incident raised questions as to 
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the openness of the free market.49 If China could be blocked from accessing oil in certain 
areas or polities, alternative options must be entertained. 
China is ultimately concerned with the physical ability to guarantee the flow of oil 
into the country. As most oil arrives from Africa and the Middle East via SLOCs, the 
issue of maritime security is central to China’s energy security. Retired naval officer and 
academic Bernard Cole stated the matter succinctly: “Petroleum is China’s preeminent 
offshore economic interest.”50 Beijing is very aware of the vulnerability of China’s oil 
imports to constriction via chokepoints, most notably the Strait of Malacca. That 
awareness has informed China’s military posture and preparation as military force is 
contemplated as a guarantor of sea passage.51 Finally, China sees the most likely cause of 
vulnerability to be its most pressing foreign policy issue – Taiwan. As outlined in the 
2005 Anti-Secession Law, Beijing has not ruled out force to guarantee the return of 
Taiwan to Beijing’s sovereignty.  
As the United States has maintained an ambiguous posture regarding assistance to 
Taiwan in the case of Beijing’s use of force, Beijing is concerned that the United States 
would respond to the use of force by disrupting the flow of energy supplies that arrive 
from the sea. The fear of a U.S. response to a Taiwan Crisis that could disrupt China’s 
economic growth informs Beijing’s defense and foreign policy, and is a key input to its 
military development.52 In the end, Beijing’s energy policy is driven by concerns about 
China’s increasing energy vulnerability. These concerns directly inform China’s strategic 
outlook and input a military dimension to China’s economic status.53 As the majority of 
imports arrive from the sea, China’s maritime strategy directly hinges upon how Beijing 
interprets its strengths, weaknesses, and opportunities. A review of Chinese military 
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thought alongside the nature of maritime strategy will frame the issues facing  
Beijing’s development of a cohesive naval doctrine.  
C. CHINESE MILITARY THOUGHT  
1. Patterns in Chinese Military Thought 
When approaching traditional Chinese military thought, a common starting point 
is the seminal work The Art of War by Sun Tzu, or Sun Zi. Within Sun Zi’s work, a 
common theme is the ability of the commander to rationally control the forces utilized in 
warfare. Writing to guide rulers in the selection of military leaders, Sun Zi notes, “If a 
general follows my estimation and you employ him, he will certainly be victorious and 
should be retained. If a general does not follow my estimation…so dismiss him.”54 The 
confidence that a competent military leader can completely control the multi-faceted 
aspects of conducting military lends itself to an emphasis on stratagem and deception as 
artful tools that can be used by generals to guide the course of warfare. Sun Zi continues: 
After estimating the advantages in accord with what you have heard, put it 
into effect with strategic power (shih) supplemented by field tactics that 
respond to external actors…Warfare is the Way (Tao) of deception. Thus 
although [you are] capable, display incapability to them. When committed 
to employing forces, feign activity. When [your objective] is nearby, make 
it appear as if distant; when far away, create the illusion of being 
nearby…Attack where they are unprepared…These are the ways military 
strategists are victorious…55 
Throughout the text, it is emphasized that the military leader must control and 
manipulate the situation at hand through their thorough understanding of all aspects of 
warfare. Aside from Sun Zi, another aspect of ancient warfare that informs modern 
Chinese strategic thought is the idea of shi. Shi roughly translates as the “strategic 
configuration of power,” or the advantageous “alignment of forces.”56  Although there is 
no direct Western theoretical equivalent of shi, it is thought to serve as one of two key 
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55 Ibid., 168. 
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ingredients in current Chinese strategic thinking. The other, “comprehensive national 
power,” or CNP, is a relative ranking of economic, diplomatic, and military power used 
by Chinese strategists to weigh the relative strength of China within the international 
community.57 Based on the classical formulation of the leader’s capacity to exercise 
strategic power and the unique aspects of shi and CNP, China’s history seems to dispose 
Beijing to a uniquely Chinese way of framing security concerns.  
Recent scholarship questions the idea of a uniquely Chinese way of viewing 
security issues. Following extensive research in Chinese military works, excluding The 
Art of War, Harvard University’s Alastair Iain Johnston found that different formulations 
of security issues throughout history did not result in security choices different from what 
Western powers might have selected. Although Sun Zi and other works of Chinese 
strategy, including the Seven Military Classics, indicate a preference for deception and a 
minimal use of force that is arguably based on traditional Chinese philosophy’s aversion 
to violence, Johnston notes the following: 
…while there is evidence that a Chinese strategic culture does exist and 
influences grand strategic choice, this strategic culture is not self-evidently 
unique, or different from certain strains in Western realpolitik thought and 
practice.58  
Between 1927 and 1985, Johnston notes that China responded to foreign policy 
crises with military force in eight out of eleven instances, or 72 percent of the time. That 
percentage is higher than other great powers over the same period; the United States used 
violence 18 percent of the time, and the Soviet Union used violence 27 percent of the 
time.59 China’s temptation to use force in crises indicates that, regardless of rhetoric, 
Beijing sees military force as a useful and valid means of solving international 
disagreements.  
                                                 
57 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2007, 6. 
58 Alistair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 31.  
59 Ibid., 256. 
 18
Although Johnston has argued that, “China has a strategic culture, and it is 
realism,”60 the recognition of China’s frequent use of armed force, coupled with 
traditional rhetoric that emphasizes an aversion to violence, has led to a more 
troublesome conclusion regarding Beijing’s understanding of military action. The parallel 
dialogue emphasizing aversion to the use of force and the actual use of force indicates a 
China that is quite willing to engage in military action while refusing to admit that its 
actions are anything but noble. Andrew Scobell of the Army War College’s Strategic 
Studies Institute has called this condition the “Chinese cult of defense.”61 Scobell notes 
that: 
The key point is that the defensive-mindedness and preference for 
nonviolent solutions to interstate disputes are not merely empty rhetoric or 
symbolic discourse, but rather are a part of a belief system that has been 
deeply internalized by Chinese civilian and military elites. The 
outcome…is a China that assertively protects and aggressively promotes 
its own national interests, up to and including acts of war, but that 
rationalizes all military moves as purely self-defensive.62 
The inherited belief within China that its motives are always pure is buttressed by 
present day Chinese defense intellectuals. The Academy of Military Science of the 
Chinese People’s Liberation Army has published a text that outlines the broad strategic 
outlook of the Chinese defense elite. Titled The Science of Military Strategy, the text 
highlights several characteristics of Chinese warfare, including the defensive nature of 
Chinese military action. In particular, it notes that:  
If a war breaks out, may it be anti-invasion, anti-separation, anti-
interference, our country will be forced into it…We have no choice but to 
take action. The war will be defensive and just because China would not 
use forces in an unlimited and unjust way.63 
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While the rhetoric of only using force as a last resort is not unique to China – it is, 
of course, widespread in the West as well – the insistence that China is always forced into 
conflict indicates that any military response on the part of Beijing, to include possible 
offensive operations against separatists, will be justified as a necessary defensive 
response to provocation. In Beijing’s eyes, the impetus to use military force is defined in 
a tautological manner; China only uses force for defense, so any use of force is therefore 
defensive. These key patterns of Chinese military thought have informed two recent 
periods in Chinese history: Communist China under the leadership of Mao Zedong, and 
post-Mao China. 
2. Chinese Military Thought in the Time of Mao  
In the modern era, the “Chinese Cult of Defense” is in part grounded by the idea 
of “active defense.”  For years, the central strategy that defined Chinese military 
planning, “active defense,” assumed an enemy’s technological superiority and relied 
upon an initial strategic defensive to absorb the attack of an invading force.   Mao 
Zedong elaborated that “active defense” takes place within the context of “people’s war,” 
where necessity dictates that geography and a larger population will serve as China’s 
military strengths.64   It is important to understand that “active defense” is not a passive 
attempt to accept the likely superior military qualities of an attacking force, but instead is 
a doctrine that advocates a proactive use of modern China’s material inferiority and 
numerical superiority. In blurring the line between attack and defense, “active defense” 
goes so far as to not rule out the use of a first strike.65  Mao’s utilization of “active 
defense” within the framework of “people’s war” served as an important  
foundation in modern Chinese military thought.  
Developed by Mao during the Chinese Civil War and the Second Sino-Japanese 
War, “people’s war” focused on a prolonged war of attrition by which conventional and 
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unconventional forces would exhaust and defeat an invading force.66 The strategy 
focused on three phases. During the first phase, a strategic defensive emphasized that 
battles with doubtful outcomes were to be avoided as the Chinese traded land for time in 
the hope that the enemy would tire and experience increasingly difficult logistical 
problems. The second phase, a strategic stalemate, focused on mobilization of the 
populace and harassment of the enemy’s consolidated positions with unconventional 
forces. Finally, during a strategic offensive phase conventional forces would be utilized 
to outmaneuver and destroy invaders.67 Following the founding of the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC) in 1949, the “people’s war” paradigm maintained its position as China 
struggled to advance its industrial and technological base. With renewed tension with the 
Soviet Union following the dissolution of the Sino-Soviet alliance in the late 1950s, Mao 
continued to emphasize the central importance of the “people’s war” to Chinese grand 
strategy.68 As the Soviet Union posed a significant continental threat to China into the 
1980s, “people’s war” and “active defense” shaped the context of Beijing’s international 
security interactions from the 1950s well into the 1980s. 
During this timeframe, the PLAN served a minor role in Chinese defense policy. 
As “people’s war” emphasized the use of geography as a major tool to be used in exercise 
of a strategic defensive, the PLAN found that maritime-oriented action that emphasized 
movement away from shore was deemed insignificant. The maritime power of Mao’s 
China was developed almost solely for defensive purposes. Wars with Japan in 
Manchuria and the United States in Korea, as well as border disputes with Vietnam, 
India, and the Soviet Union, included no significant naval action.  The neglect of the 
PLAN by Beijing’s defense planners thus appears to be a rational response to the security 
situation between the 1930s and 1980s.69 As China had neither the military means nor the 
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immediate need to challenge dominant maritime powers, primarily the United States, 
maritime missions were limited to coastal defense and control. 
3. Contemporary Chinese Military Thought 
A central feature in reorienting modern Chinese military thought has been the 
decline and fall of the Soviet Union. With the death of Mao in 1976, Beijing began to 
modify the Mao-dominated concept of “people’s war.” By 1978, the leadership in Beijing 
pushed to adapt the concept of “people’s war” to the reality of modern warfare; the new 
concept, really only a modification, was titled “people’s war under modern conditions.” 
Under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, “people’s war under modern conditions” 
attempted to deal with the Soviet Union’s assessed ability to rapidly strike and seize 
limited objectives along the Chinese border. The new theory accordingly sought a way to 
emphasize the importance of conventional forces during the opening phases of a 
conflict.70 Due to the possible loss of industrial capacity and territory from a rapid Soviet 
advance, Beijing no longer envisioned the first phase of “people’s war” to be an entirely 
defensive affair. Key locations in the north and east would require defense in order to 
maintain China’s growing vibrancy.71 By 1985, analysts in Beijing assessed that the 
Soviet Union no longer loomed as China’s most significant strategic threat. Rethinking 
its security threats, Beijing revised its assessment of what most challenged China. Instead 
of “people’s war,” “local” or “limited war” became the strategy of choice.  
Characterized as conflicts with limited geographical boundaries, high intensity, 
and minimal parties involved, “local/limited war” permitted the first ever strategic 
assessment in which China realistically began to address interests other than those 
dominated by concern over invasion from the Asian landmass.72 The Persian Gulf War of 
1991 forced Beijing to realize that technologically-dominant militaries held a significant 
battlefield advantage. In response, Beijing further modified the PLA’s operational 
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doctrine to emphasize the previously-neglected benefits of advanced weaponry and 
technological dominance. Known as “limited war under high-tech conditions,” the new 
outlook melded the need to innovate military equipment with the new orientation towards 
localized military objectives.73 In Beijing, it was acknowledged that military equipment 
was outdated and that the operational doctrine that the PLA had inherited from the Mao 
years was obsolete.74 To meet its security requirements in the 21st century, Beijing 
wanted a military that was modern in both doctrine and equipment. Of note, while 
“limited war under high tech conditions” appears to be an evolution of Chinese military 
doctrine, the impetus to support both “people’s war” and the defensive mind-set of that 
doctrine is alive and well in Chinese doctrine. The official white paper on China’s 
military needs, China’s National Defense in 2006, continues to proclaim that the Chinese 
defensive policy will only ever be defensive in nature, and that the concept of “people’s 
war” is not one that has been discarded but is undergoing development.75 As China 
modifies antiquated doctrine and equipment to face the prospect of modern war, the 
ideological and historical value of the “people’s war” doctrine, along with its implicit 
“active defense,” remains a part of Beijing’s defense policy planning. 
As China’s military thought has evolved, so too has its orientation towards the 
sea. Alongside the beginnings of its strategic reevaluation in 1985, the economic center 
of gravity has shifted from the interior to China’s littorals; this shift has prompted a 
significant rethinking of Beijing’s strategic interests away from the continent and towards 
maritime matters.76 The orientation towards the sea has precipitated a new conception of 
territory and is the principal redefinition within China’s strategic outlook. China now 
views its territorial interests as including all ocean space out to the limits of its Economic 
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Exclusion Zone (200 nautical miles from shore), a fact codified in Beijing’s 1992 
maritime law (Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone).77 Within the 
claimed region rests most of the South China Sea and the island of Taiwan, itself the 
most pressing strategic concern of the modern regime in Beijing. Both regions are 
considered vital for both the reclamation of national sovereignty and for the vital access 
they provide to shipping lanes and the Straits of Malacca.78 For political and economic 
reasons, the sea has taken on a central place in Chinese strategic thought. With a new 
emphasis on maritime interests as central to the well-being of China, there exists a 
newfound relevance of maritime strategy to China’s security. To gauge the success of 
Beijing’s attempts to modernize the PLAN, it is necessary to summarize the basic tenets 
of maritime strategy as a whole alongside the efforts of China’s strategic planners to 
implement maritime-oriented defense policies, policies driven by China’s interests.  
D. MARITIME STRATEGY AND THE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY 
NAVY 
1. A Summary of Maritime Strategy 
Warfare at sea has a quality distinct from warfare on land. As the sea provides an 
environment that encourages independent movement over large areas, overly prescriptive 
attempts to define how naval officers ought to fight have historically been discouraged, if 
not outright ignored. Traditionally, the offensive instinct and judgment of a ship’s captain 
served as all the theorizing that was required in naval warfare.79 However, as naval 
warfare is not the only component of a maritime strategy, there is more to a nation’s 
orientation and policy regarding the sea than simply outfitting a sound navy. Maritime 
strategy involves all activity accounted for on, under, and above the ocean, including 
shipping, fishing, mineral exploration, and coastal defense. In short, a navy serves a 
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nation’s maritime strategy; the strategy does not serve the navy.80 As a maritime strategy 
addresses all of a nation’s actions with regard to the sea, the role of economics is central 
to the understanding of a maritime strategy. During a state of war, economic 
considerations include the movement of goods, personnel, and resources between theaters 
and campaigns; states with sea borders must consider the safe movement of their goods 
while contemplating the endangerment of their enemy’s goods.81 According to naval 
historian Nicholas Tracy, the reality of the movement of goods at sea traditionally shaped 
the understanding of the purpose of a “maritime strategy,” with the term “used to indicate 
the employment of naval forces to achieve political ends by their impact on international 
trade.”82 Due to its use as a means to conduct trade, “sea control,” the guaranteeing of 
friendly access to sea trade while denying the enemy the same, is the central feature in 
the naval warfare component of a maritime strategy.83  
2. Sir Julian Corbett and Alfred Thayer Mahan 
Although naval officers have resisted attempts to codify the principles of sea 
warfare into a theory of maritime strategy, two prominent thinkers of the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century produced works that most closely fill the role of foundation 
works in maritime thought.  
The first, Sir Julian Corbett, was a British lawyer and naval historian writing 
around the time of World War I. Corbett recognized the central place of trade to naval 
warfare and sought to define how a campaign at sea might best accomplish national  
objectives. Recognizing the geographically unique aspects of the sea, Corbett understood 
that, unlike land warfare where a nation might expend all of its energy against an enemy, 
the sea was distinct: 
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A (maritime) war may be limited not only because the importance of the 
object is too limited to call forth the whole national force, but also because 
the sea may be made to present an insuperable physical obstacle…That is 
to say, a war may be limited physically by the strategic isolation of the 
object…84 
The nature of war at sea is limited in scope. Not only is war at sea limited due to 
the isolation of the objective, but war at sea is also limited in its ability to direct force 
against a well-supported continental power. Due to its limited nature, a maritime strategy 
should never plan to defeat a land power with sea power alone; some form of land power 
must be acquired for that purpose. For Corbett, the true purpose of a maritime strategy 
was to outline the relationship of sea forces to land forces; naval force was simply one 
aspect of the broader maritime strategy, the strategy that characterized all aspects of a 
nation’s interaction with the sea.85 Limited in capacity by its environment and intended to 
support the political objectives of a state, the navy’s ultimate role was tied to the land. 
Corbett outlined that orientation by claiming it was the task of the navy to ask “What 
does the Army want to do?” while the land component of force, the army, asks “What can 
the Navy do for us?”86 As the movement of trade has traditionally been the purpose of 
maritime strategy, sea power can best support an army through its ability to guarantee the 
movement of friendly trade and troops while hindering the same for an enemy. Corbett 
summarized this aspect of sea power as having both a positive and negative connotation: 
The object of naval warfare must always be directly or indirectly either to 
secure the command of the sea or to prevent the enemy from securing 
it…The mere assertion…that the object of naval warfare is to get  
command of the sea actually connotes the proposition that the command is 
normally in dispute. It is this state of dispute with which naval strategy is 
most nearly concerned…87 
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Corbett is clear that supporting the objectives of land-based power, ensuring the 
movement of friendly goods, and disrupting an enemy’s movement of goods are at the 
heart of naval warfare. Corbett’s emphasis on both sea access and the denial of sea access 
present a broad context in which a nation may exercise naval power.  
Alfred Thayer Mahan, a captain in the United States Navy and an older 
contemporary of Corbett’s, also understood the central importance of trade to a nation’s 
well-being. Published in 1890, his The Influence of Sea Power Upon History claimed that 
the use of the ocean as a means of promoting trade was the core of a nation’s maritime 
activity, and a navy only existed to protect that trade.88 Refining his definition of what 
made trade beneficial, Mahan noted the central importance of production, shipping, and 
colonies to the creation of great maritime powers: 
In these three things – production, with the necessity of exchanging 
products, shipping, whereby the exchange is carried on, and colonies, 
which facilitate and enlarge the operations of shipping and tend to protect 
it by multiplying points of safety – is to be found the key to much of 
history, as well as of the policy, of nations bordering upon the sea.89 
Mahan argued that it was the need for shipping that defined the navy’s role. That 
role was to promote and protect trade. During wartime, in order to promote and protect 
trade, Mahan thought that it was not enough to simply harass an enemy by interdicting 
the occasional vessel. Instead, to truly pressure an opponent’s economy a nation had to 
have the naval force to prevent the enemy from engaging in any trade. Arguing for the 
ability to dominate an enemy, Mahan outlines his objective for command of the sea: 
It is not the taking of individual ships or convoys, be they few or many, 
that strikes down the money power of a nation; it is the possession of that 
overbearing power on the sea which drives the enemy’s flag from it, or 
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common, closes the highways by which commerce moves to and from the 
enemy’s shores. This overbearing power can only be exercised by great 
navies…90 
Along with the need for a great navy to drive an enemy’s flag from the sea, any 
navy would have to contend with an opposing navy that intended to do the same to 
friendly shipping. Hence, an effective navy that could truly protect one’s own shipping 
and threaten another’s, a navy that could withstand an opposing force, would be a navy 
prepared to gain absolute control of a sea by engaging the enemy fleet and establishing 
dominance. Mahan expanded on his theory of denial of the sea to others via command of 
the sea with an emphasis on offensive and decisive action. Believing the navy to be the 
equivalent of an army on a field, Mahan argued that the role of the navy was to be 
offensive in character; ports served the role of defense in naval warfare, but fleets have a 
uniquely offensive character.91 Starting from his emphasis on the importance of trade, 
Mahan’s thought leads to the conclusion that the purpose of a navy is to have the 
offensive ability to project force against another navy. While he and Corbett agree about 
the central role of trade and sea access to defining maritime strategy, Mahan places 
greater emphasis on a navy’s ability to ensure both positive command of the sea and 
project offensive power. Mahan’s works have been used by naval planners in several 
countries to justify the expense of large navies in support of a nation’s maritime 
ambitions. His emphasis on the offensive character of navies has at times led purported 
followers of his thought to neglect the centrality the Mahan assigned to the movement of 
men and goods over the sea.  The United States Navy’s Maritime Strategy of 1986, with 
its emphasis on attacking the Soviet Union’s periphery, falls into this category.92  
Corbett and Mahan both start their analysis of maritime strategy by identifying the 
central role of trade to a nation’s economic well-being. Differences arise in matters of 
emphasis.  Corbett views command of the sea as fleeting, while Mahan espouses the 
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necessity to utilize battle fleets to exert true sea control. What is important to recall is that 
the heart of naval warfare is the promotion or interdiction of trade. Distraction from that 
central task takes away from a navy’s ability to support a maritime strategy. A 
consideration of the reception of these two theorist’s works by the PLAN and strategic 
thinkers in Beijing will better outline the formulation of modern Chinese naval thought. 
a. Corbett and Chinese Naval Thought 
The first aspect of Corbett’s thought that is applicable to China’s navy is 
the notion of limited warfare. With a fleet that is unable to challenge the supremacy of 
the United States Navy, Beijing must look for means of engagement that would not 
escalate beyond the capabilities of the PLAN. The limited nature of war at sea presents 
China, the weaker power, with that means. Corbett is clear that the sea is not the land; it 
cannot be conquered. Instead, Corbett relates that, “(c)ommand of the sea, therefore 
means nothing but the control of maritime communications, whether for commercial or 
military purposes.”93 Limiting the intensity of war at sea by selecting when to harass an 
enemy who cannot command all parts of the ocean is a key factor in naval warfare that 
favors the weaker power. Additionally, although seeking out the enemy is generally 
considered an important factor in warfare, Chinese thinkers conclude that, as searching 
for the enemy implies reacting to the enemy’s disposition, devotion to the imperative to 
seek out the enemy surrenders the initiative to the enemy,.94 Instead, Corbett’s emphasis 
on dispersing fleets and controlling the initiative, an emphasis very much in line with Sun 
Zi’s advocacy of controlling the enemy’s perception through deception,95 best serves the 
needs of a navy that does not wish to plan a major sea engagement.  
A concept closely related to limiting war through dispersion is the idea of 
sea-denial. Due to the seas’ open geography, it is impossible to police all of the sea at 
once. This openness allows a navy to upset a strategic status quo by harassing a stronger 
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fleet at its weak points.96 Through harassment, it is possible to fulfill one-half of 
Corbett’s dictum regarding the object of naval warfare – preventing enemy security at 
sea. With a smaller navy and forces that operate close to shore, sea-denial is a strategy 
that is well-suited to the PLAN.97 Technology gives the PLAN a particularly attractive 
means of enacting a strategy of sea-denial. With predominant air and surface forces, there 
is little the PLAN could do to counter its most likely maritime threat, the USN. Instead, 
the use of submarines would somewhat guarantee freedom of movement and the ability 
to harass a powerful surface force. As a tool that makes the prospect of absolute 
command-of-the-sea nearly impossible, the submarine is ideal. 98  A PLAN that desires to 
enact a Corbett-like strategy of sea-denial would most likely acquire as modern a 
submarine force as possible. The use of a submarine fleet to conduct a strategy of sea-
denial also conforms to the idea of the first period of “active defense” – the strategic 
defensive.99 Using the mobility and surprise of submarines would allow the PLAN to 
engage a menacing fleet far from shore, thereby beginning the process of wearing down 
an invader before they arrive at China’s shores. A key statement in the 2006 version of 
China’s National Defense appears to confirm a theoretical outlook that has not entirely 
abandoned the “people’s war” from which “active defense” arises: “The Navy is 
enhancing research into the theory of naval operations and exploring the strategy and 
tactics of maritime people’s war under modern conditions.”100 
b. Mahan and Chinese Naval Thought 
Aside from the frequently identified emphasis on trade and offensive 
power, Mahan’s work serves as a useful tool for the analysis of geopolitics. Specifically, 
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in his outline of the conditions that affect a maritime power, Mahan lists six topics: 
geographical position, physical conformation, extent of territory, the size of the 
population, the national character, and the character of the government.101 While China 
has a large population, vibrant commercial sub-culture, and government that currently 
supports maritime growth, China’s geography tends to weaken its resolve to strive for 
great sea power status. Mahan notes that geography can impact a country in the following 
way: 
It may be pointed out…that if a nation be so situated that it is neither 
forced to defend itself by land nor induced to seek extension of its territory 
by way of the land, it has, by the very unity of its aim directed upon the 
sea, an advantage as compared with a people one of whose boundaries is 
continental.102 
Mahan’s argument is that a nation distracted by continental concerns has a 
disadvantage in acquiring dominant maritime power when compared to a nation with 
solely maritime geographic concerns. An apt comparison would be England and France 
during the Napoleonic Wars. Able to focus on its seapower, England thwarted the 
particular ambitions of Napoleon that relied upon maritime dominance, e.g. an invasion 
of England. Surrounded on three sides by large land borders, and with numerous border 
disputes, China’s maritime potential will always be hindered by the concerns on its land 
borders.103 This concern with geopolitics lends itself to great debate within the Chinese 
defense planning community. Chinese intellectuals often highlight the diversity, and 
therefore complexity, of China’s geography. With regards to the sea, concerns with 
sovereignty and control of its resources are now often equated with continental 
concerns.104 Additionally, the growing economic reliance on access to the sea is a critical 
impetus to China’s new geopolitical orientation. Combined with concerns regarding the 
full return of Taiwan to the PRC’s control, the centrality of sovereignty over geographic 
                                                 
101 Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 28-29. 
102 Ibid., 29. 
103 Kane, 43. 
104Guangqian and Youshi, 440-441.  
 31
locations is a key aspect of China’s emerging maritime strategy.105 It is no surprise that 
PLAN Senior Captain Xu Qi, writing in the military journal Chinese Military Science, 
argues that China’s current security concerns exist where China has the most interest and 
least experience – the sea. He states: 
There exist many uncertain factors in the security environment along 
China’s borders, especially in the maritime dimension…From a 
geostrategic perspective, China’s heartland faces the sea, the benefits of 
economic development are increasingly dependent on the sea, [and] 
security threats come from the sea.106 
If geography serves as a mitigating effect to a continental power’s attempt 
to acquire significant maritime power, the Chinese, in accord with Mahan’s comments on 
geography, seem well aware of the need to focus outward and deal with the complexities 
of sea power. 
The topic that Mahan espoused that most resonates with Chinese naval 
planners is that of the offensive character of naval war.   With the ideology of 
communism lost, the PRC has turned to nationalism and economic development as 
legitimizing principles of the regime. With regards to economic development, strategists 
in Beijing increasingly combine an awareness of the importance of the SLOCs to 
economic growth with what is viewed as Mahan’s outline of the absolute nature of true 
command-of-the-sea.107   Viewed in this light, Mahanian naval theory takes on a certain 
zero-sum quality, one where guaranteeing a nation’s economic well-being lends a sense 
of inevitability to the prospect of war at sea. In order to protect and guarantee trade, 
competitor nations must eventually come to blows regarding access to the sea.108 To 
prevail in conflict, a nation requires a strong fleet. 
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An early proponent within China for a strong fleet that could win future 
battles at sea was Admiral Liu Huaqing. A veteran of the Chinese Civil War, in 1954 Liu 
was sent to the Frunze Naval Academy to study under the future head of the Soviet Navy, 
Admiral Sergei Gorshkov. At Frunze, Liu would have learned of Gorshkov’s belief that a 
great power must have a strong and capable battle fleet.109 Additionally, he is likely to 
have absorbed Gorshkov’s belief that the purpose of a navy is to both defend the 
Motherland and attack an adversary from the sea110  As head of the PLAN from 1982-
1988, Liu presided over the force at the same time Deng Xiaoping transitioned Chinese 
military doctrine away from “people’s war” and towards “people’s war under modern 
conditions.” Liu used this opportunity to change the primary mission of the PLAN from 
coastal defense to “offshore active defense.” In doing so, he extended the redirected the 
operational reach of the PLAN further offshore, turned the PLAN away from a reactive 
and defensive posture, and instituted a more offensive mission.111 Without abandoning 
the long-time doctrine of the PLA, “active defense” in “people’s war,” Liu turned from 
defense to the offense; conceptually, “offshore active defense” appears to be a version of 
“active defense” projected onto the sea.112 The emphasis on an offensive capability that 
can exert sea control has been outlined in recent Chinese writings. The 2004 China 
National Defense white paper states that, “the PLA Navy is responsible for safeguarding 
China’s maritime security and maintaining the sovereignty of its territorial seas along 
with its maritime rights and interests.”113 While the 2006 paper does not explicitly 
mention sovereignty and China’s maritime interests, it declares that the PLAN must 
develop a “gradual extension of strategic depth for offshore defensive operations.”114 It is 
within the context of the need to protect its sovereignty and interests that China seeks a 
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strong fleet capable of offshore defensive operations.115 Mahan’s conceptual outline that 
traces the need for offensive naval power back to the necessity to guard trade, seems to 
perfectly justify China’s desire to expand its fleet in the service of its economy.116 It is 
possible, however, that Mahan’s writings have more frequently served as a respectable 
theoretical justification within the PLAN for the offensive orientation already included 
within the “active defense” on which Liu’s “offshore active defense” is based. 
With geopolitics at the fore of China’s concern regarding its seapower and 
with the shift towards a more offensive orientation, the PLAN has developed an outward 
orientation that Liu Huaqing codified in the “offshore active defense” strategy. The 
implementation of “offshore active defense” has been coupled with attempts by Beijing’s 
to extend its maritime strength beyond China’s periphery – an effort termed the “string of 
pearls” approach.  Together, the “offshore active defense” and “string of pearls” provide 
the strategic direction the PLAN requires to modernize its forces. Understanding the 
intent and implications of these doctrines is central to understanding the growth of 
China’s PLAN.   
E. THE MODERNIZATION OF THE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY 
NAVY 
With definable and unsecured geographic and economic interests in the sea and 
with an understanding of naval warfare as both an extension of “active defense” and a 
distinct form of warfare with a nature of its own, China’s naval leaders needed to develop 
a maritime strategy that could serve China’s unique outlook and needs. There are two 
concerns that are essential to the success of a strategy. The first is a question of the extent 
to which a strategy achieves national objectives. The second concern relates to the 
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specific strategic culture from which the strategy is developed; with regard to the second 
concern, a strategy for the PLAN would have to be acceptable to the PLA and Chinese 
leadership.117 The strategy chosen – the “offshore active defense” – took advantage of 
China’s unique maritime geography and its limited naval forces. A review of the 
implications of the “offshore active defense” will shed light on the direction of China’s 
recent force modernization.  
1. Liu Huaqing, Offshore Active Defense, and the String of Pearls 
Liu Huaqing’s transformation of the PLAN’s overall mission is the key turning 
point in Chinese naval modernization. Liu ensured that “offshore active defense” closely 
mirrors the PLA’s “active defense” doctrine in design. Specifically, “offshore active 
defense” includes the necessity of ensuring coastal defense, mobile warfare at sea, and 
the harassment of an enemy far at sea by guerrilla-type units.118 Combined, these 
elements would allow for a defense-in-depth through the utilization of two “island-
chains” as offshore lines of defense.119 The PLAN’s new doctrine leverages China’s 
familiarity with land power by defining the offshore objectives of its maritime strategy 
through adjacent land masses.120 Additionally, multiple lines of defense allow for 
flexibility and a degree of uncertainty regarding where the PLAN will emphasize its 
strength (See Figure 2). The “first island chain” includes a line that stretches from the 
southern approaches of the South China Sea, up through the Ryukyu Islands, and finally 
to the southern tip of Japan. Included within this line are the Yellow Sea, most of the East 
China, and the whole of the South China Sea.121 A “second island chain” stretches from 
the Kurile Islands in the north, past the Marianas Islands and Guam, finally down through 
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the Caroline Islands.122 The aspect of the “offshore active defense” that appealed to the 
PLAN’s superiors in the PLA is the delineation of the strategy into “phases;” the use of 
“phases” as objectives is traditionally a practice of land warfare where fixed geographic 
boundaries serve to delineate a military’s goals.123 While the delineation of “island-
chains” serves to guide the PLAN in developing increased levels of operational reach, the 
ultimate long-term objective of the strategy is to consistently increase the offshore range 
of the PLAN until China is able to field a blue-water force with a global reach. The 
flexibility of Liu’s strategy serves to both conceal the likely maximum geographical 
objectives of the PLAN and allow for the expansion of the PLAN’s mission beyond 
currently defined limits.124 In keeping with the three aspects of warfare derived from 
“active defense” – guerilla warfare, mobile warfare, and positional warfare – a PLAN 
planned around the “offshore active defense” will seek decisive strength near-shore, the 
ability to engage another fleet in the seas near China, and the ability to harass an enemy 
farther out to sea. The strategic depth and defensive advantages of the “offshore active 
defense” are in accord with traditional Maoist strategic thought.125 
Along with the “offshore active defense,” analysts of the PLAN have identified 
another key element to China’s maritime strategy. In line with Mahan’s thought that a 
maritime power must have production, shipping, and colonies for overseas access, 
Beijing has initiated dedicated efforts to increase its geopolitical influence through a 
pattern of offshore presence and economic influence. Termed the “string of pearls” by 
Western analysts, the strategy involves the diplomatic and economic development of 
various nodes, or “pearls,” along China’s SLOC that connects China to the Middle 
East.126  
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Figure 2.   The First and Second Island Chains.  
PRC military theorists conceive of two island “chains” as forming a geographic basis for 
China’s maritime defensive perimeter. (From 127) 
 
Various “pearls” include investment in the development of deep-water ports at 
Sittwa, Myanmar and Gwadar, Pakistan. Undertaken in an effort to build relationships 
with countries near China’s vital sea lane, the “string of pearls” represents Beijing’s 
attempt to expand not only its military power but also its economic, diplomatic, and 
ideational power.128 With 70 percent of its oil imports arriving from Africa or the Middle 
                                                 
127 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2007, 16. 
128 Lampton, “The Faces of Chinese Power,” 116. 
 37
East, China is developing the “string of pearls” specifically to build relationships that will 
help guarantee China’s economic interests in a time of increased competition for natural 
resources.129 As China increases its overseas involvement via the “string of pearls” 
policy, it should be of no surprise that the PLAN attempts to expand its offshore 
capability in order to protect China’s interests. Beijing recognizes the increased 
importance of overseas development and wishes to ensure its safety; in that light, the 
argument for a powerful navy, one that does not rely on the goodwill of others to protect 
China’s SLOC and the overseas economic concerns delineated by the “string of pearls,” 
serves as a powerful driving force in an the expansion of the PLAN.130 
Together with the “string of pearls” strategy of China’s foreign policy, the 
implementation of Liu Huaqing’s “offshore active defense” serves as a powerful driving 
force in China’s maritime strategy. China’s maritime strategy has, in turn, served to direct 
the PLAN’s greater force modernization. A review of the PLAN’s force modernization 
will highlight both the relative importance of the PLAN in China’s defense planning and 
how well the PLAN’s development meets the needs of the broader maritime strategy of 
China. 
2. Force Modernization 
a. Force Structure   
The present-day PLAN consists of approximately 260,000 personnel 
divided equally between officers, non-commissioned officers, and conscripts. With a 
PLA of 2.3 million, the PLAN makes up 12.6 percent of the total force.131 Although the 
PLA as a whole has undergone several force reductions since 1985, the most recent force 
reduction in 2003 called for the culling of 200,000 positions within the PLA. Notably, 
while the ground forces were reduced by 1.5 percent, the PLAN was increased by 3.8 
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percent.132 The restructuring of the PLA that led to the growth within the PLAN is in 
keeping with the 2004 China’s National Defense white paper’s explicitly stated goals of 
optimizing service composition to increase the size of the technical services (PLAN, 
PLAAF, and rocket forces).133 
In terms of command structure, the fleet commanders are subordinate to 
the ground unit commanders in charge of the military regions that contain the fleets. Such 
a subordination to land forces indicates a secondary role for the PLAN even during a time 
of maritime conflict.134 The command relationship is further confused by the PLA’s 
distinction between military rank and positional rank. Fleet commanders are the same 
military rank as military region commanders, but the positional rank of the fleet is one 
step below the military region.135 A change has occurred in the policy-planning level of 
the PLAN. In 2004, the head of the PLN, Admiral Zhang Dingfa, was added to the body 
that commands the whole of the PLA, the Central Military Commission.136 Although 
Zhang was personally promoted in positional rank, the PLAN as an organization was not 
simultaneously elevated in positional status. The PLAN remains subordinate to the 
ground forces’ four general departments, a situation that provides the PLAN with a voice 
at the highest levels of China’s defense policy-makers while still keeping the service 
subordinate to the institutionally dominant ground forces.137 
b. Budget  
In terms of budget numbers, Western sources have consistently assessed 
that the PLA’s published budget does not represent the actual defense expenditures of 
China. Failure to account for various personnel costs, the strategic rocket forces, the 
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paramilitary People’s Armed Police (PAP), and foreign military sales handled through 
the foreign affairs bureaucracy account for the discrepancy. Beijing claims its 2007 
defense budget was $45 billion, while the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) 
estimates China’s 2007 military related spending to be between $85 and $125 billion (See 
Figure 3).138  
As a measure of the service’s relative importance within the PLA, the 
PLAN’s percentage of the overall budget has increased during past several decades. One 
estimate holds that between 1950 and 1980 the PLAN received the smallest percentage of 
the PLA’s budget – 18.4 percent.139 A key indicator that Beijing is relying more and 
more on its navy to shoulder the burden of defense has been the increase in the PLAN’s 
budget percentage since 1980; maritime interests are seen as holding an increased level of 
importance in China’s national defense.140 By 1991, the PLAN’s percentage of the 
PLA’s budget had risen to 32.7 percent.141 If allocation of funding and resources is an 
indication of relative importance within the defense planning process, recent decades 
have seen that the PLAN’s importance has dramatically increased. 
Interestingly, the importance of the military within the greater Chinese 
budget has decreased in recent years. From 1950 to 1980, the PLA’s budget averaged 
6.35 percent of Beijing’s expenditures; by the 1990s, that percentage had dropped to 1.4 
percent.142 Additionally, while China’s economy has averaged almost ten percent growth 
since 1980, the average increase in the reported annual defense budget between 1996 and 
2006 has been 11.8 percent.143  
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Figure 3.   Chinese Defense Budget and Estimates of Total Defense-Related 
Expenditures.  
The graphic depicts China’s official defense budget since 1994, and associated Defense 
Intelligence Agency estimates of actual defense expenditure. All figures in 2006 US 
Dollars (From 144) 
 
The defense budget increase is not significantly greater than China’s GDP 
growth, indicating that increased Chinese defense budgets are due to the fact that an 
economically prosperous China has more money to spend. Even taking into account U.S. 
estimates of a budget higher than what Beijing reports presents a fairly even picture of 
defense allocation. Between 1994 and 2005, Beijing’s announced budget averaged 2.0 
percent of national GDP, while U.S. estimates of defense spending as a percentage of 
China’s GDP have consistently been near 8.0 percent on the low end and 11.8 percent on 
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the high end.145 Beijing’s defense spending is significant but, as a share of the overall 
economy over time, it has remained relatively unchanged.  
In the end, the increased funding for the PLAN represents an internal 
reorientation of the PLA towards maritime interests. China’s defense budget is growing 
as China’s economy grows. It is the manner of allocation that indicates the central place 
of the PLAN in fulfilling Beijing’s long-term policy objectives.  
c. The Fleet  
Divided between the North Sea, East Sea, and South Sea Fleets, China’s 
navy has a substantial number of vessels. As of 2007, it included at least 72 surface 
combatants, 58 attack submarines, and 50 heavy and medium amphibious vessels.146 
Notably, the fleet has no aircraft carriers and only three oilers capable of extending 
operations with refueling at sea.147 A breakdown of vessel modernization by type will 
highlight areas of importance to the PLAN. 
Even though it was instituted two years after the 1949 founding of the 
PLAN, the submarine service is listed first in order of protocol among the five branches 
of the PLAN (submarine forces, surface forces, naval aviation, coastal defense, and 
Marine Corps).148 Since 1990, the submarine force has decreased in number from 92 to 
only 58 hulls. However, the number of high-tech hulls has increased during that same 
period from one to 22.149 Among those high-tech hulls, China has recently acquired eight 
Russian-made Kilo submarines, diesel-powered boats capable of firing modern SS-N-27 
Sizzler anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM).150 The Russian-made submarines join a force 
of domestically produced hulls that include the high-quality Song and nuclear-powered 
Shang submarines. Altogether, between 2002 and 2007, China either purchased or 
                                                 
145 Anthony Cordesman and Martin Kleiber, Chinese Military Modernization: Force Development 
and Strategic Capabilities (Washington, DC: CSIS Press, 2007), 55. 
146 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2007, 3. 
147 Cordesman and Kleiber, 124. 
148 Office of Naval Intelligence, China’s Navy 2007, 31. 
149 Cordesman and Kleiber, 120. 
150 O’Rourke, 8-9. 
 42
produced 21 attack submarines capable of utilizing ASCMs, wake-homing torpedoes, or 
mines.151 Based on the production-rate of higher-end hulls, combined with the 
acquisition of Russian hulls, foreign analysts have developed a degree of respect for 
China’s industrial and technological capacity to develop a competent and effective 
submarine force.152 What is interesting is that the actual utilization of China’s submarine 
force is low; between 2000 and 2006, the USN estimated that the PLAN averaged only 
three extended submarine patrols per year.153 China is expanding its modernized 
submarine force, but the operational competence of that force is in question.154 
The surface forces of the PLAN have also undergone significant 
modernization. Since the 1990s, China has purchased four Sovremenny-class destroyers 
from Russia, each capable of carrying the SS-N-22 Sunburn ASCM.155 The Sovremenny-
class destroyers are complemented by a total of eight new indigenously produced 
destroyer and frigate classes. Of the destroyers, nine hulls of five different classes have 
been produced, while 16 frigate hulls of three classes have been produced.156 Aside from 
the significant anti-surface capabilities of the Sovremmeny’s, the general trend in China’s 
surface force is to develop improved anti-air capabilities. The newest destroyer-class, the 
Luzhou, appears to be built specifically as an anti-air platform. Although only two are in 
service, the Luzhou-class carries the SA-N-6 surface-to-air missile (SAM), capable of 
intercept at distances up to 50 nautical miles.157 Altogether, the Chinese surface force 
represents an attempt to solidify anti-surface force while developing China’s lagging anti-
air capability. 
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A topic of great speculation has been that of China’s possible acquisition 
of a functioning aircraft carrier. China’s likelihood of acquiring a functioning carrier will 
depend on two factors. The first is how well the PLAN’s current operational doctrine 
incorporates a carrier into its design.158 Within the PLAN, an aircraft carrier is seen as a 
key symbol of a powerful nation. During an interview regarding the PLAN’s aircraft 
carrier plans, PLAN Senior Colonel Zhang Chengmao was clear as to the value of a 
carrier for China’s fleet: 
The modern aircraft carrier is a reflection of the great power of a nation’s 
navy. It is also a comprehensive reflection of the political, economic, 
national defense, and scientific and technological power of a nation. From 
a certain perspective, possessing a modern aircraft carrier is not only an 
indication of whether or not a navy is powerful, but is also a reflection of a 
nation’s naval strategy and overall national strength.159 
Unfortunately, while air coverage over the South China Sea would assist 
the PLAN in controlling it, should the need arise, the current PLA focus on the return of 
Taiwan does not require the PLAN to field aviation assets far out to sea.Shore-based 
aircraft are adequate for that task.160 A carrier’s value to China’s prestige is thus not 
matched by China’s immediate strategic requirements.  
The second issue is cost. China has attempted to acquire carriers through 
foreign purchase. In the recent past, China has acquired four out-of-service carrier hulls – 
the former HMAS Melbourne, and ex-Russian ships Minsk, Kiev, and Varyag. With the 
exception of the Varyag, these vessels have since been either dismantled or turned into 
tourist attractions. The most likely reason is cost – the cost of refitting an aircraft carrier 
is prohibitive. Estimates of the Indian Navy’s attempt to refurbish the ex-Russian carrier 
Admiral Gorshkov at a cost of $2.0 billion USD would be far too taxing to the PLA.161 
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With the requirement of three carriers in order to field one at sea (one in work-ups, one in 
overhaul), the total cost of $6.0 billion to refurbish, equip, and man a carrier and carrier 
air wing, one effective aircraft carrier would require between 5.7 to 8.5 percent of the 
PLA’s budget.162 China may choose to pursue a helicopter carrier, but a blue-water 
aircraft carrier capable of dedicated air control is not in accord with either the PLA’s 
most pressing strategic concern, Taiwan, or its budgetary restrictions. 
The PLAN Air Force (PLANAF) suffers from its secondary status to both 
the PLAN’s submarine and surface forces and the PLA Air Force (PLAAF). The most 
important element within the PLANAF is its helicopter force.  The first Chinese service 
to use helicopters, the PLANAF continues to provide support to surface vessels at sea. 
Unfortunately, the PLANAF lacks critical fixed-wing capabilities, including anti-
submarine warfare (ASW) platforms and a lack of effective in-flight tankers.163 While 
the shore-based bomber fleet is outdated, modernization to the PLAN’s fighter 
component has been extensive. A total of 48 out of 346 fighters are recently acquired 
Russian-made Su-30MK2s.   24 Su-30MK2s are considered nearly equal to a U.S. battle 
group’s air wing.164 Unfortunately, the modernization of the air fleet has not coincided 
with an extension of its effective offshore range. With no aircraft carriers and limited in-
flight refueling, the effectiveness of the PLANAF for anything but near-shore defense is 
minimal. 
A key aspect of China’s naval strategy is its missile inventory. Advanced 
ASCMs, to include the SS-N-22 and SS-N-27, have been acquired, and surface-to-air 
(SAM) missile systems have been improved to cover the whole of the Taiwan Strait.165 
Of more pressing concern is the large numbers of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) 
China has acquired. As of October 2006, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) 
estimated that between 875 and 975 SRBMs, particularly CSS-6 and CSS-7 missiles 
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capable of hitting targets up to 350 nautical miles from shore, are aligned across from 
Taiwan; estimates are that number will increase by 100 missiles per year.166  Of 
particular note, the PLAN has expressed the desire to develop the ability to attack vessels 
at sea using SRBMs equipped with maneuvering re-entry warheads.167 Designed 
particularly for use against approaching aircraft carriers, the desire for ship-killing 
SRBMs launched from shore indicates a near-shore anti-access intent, one that fits well 
with China’s desire to keep other forces, notably U.S. forces, from interfering with a 
theoretical military action against Taiwan. 
Reviewed as a whole, the Chinese fleet modernization appears directed 
towards denying access to interlopers near China’s shore. This particularly suits the 
desire to prevent interference in case of a violent conflict with Taiwan. Increased anti-air 
capability on surface platforms would help deny air superiority to opponents when those 
platforms sail to the South China Sea. Otherwise, the emphasis on submarines and 
missile systems, both shore and sea based, that would slow an intruder are in line with the 
“active defense” precept of utilizing the ocean as a defensive barrier against attack. China 
is slowly developing forces that can move farther from shore, but the still limited 
capability to logistically support these forces indicates that command-of-the-sea along 
China’s SLOCs is still a goal for the PLAN. At best, sea-denial is the doctrine with which 
China is most capable of achieving proficiency.  
3. Matching Means and Ends – The Purpose of the Modern PLAN 
With an economy that requires guaranteed access to offshore energy resources 
coupled with significant sovereignty issues, China will determine the worth of the PLAN 
by its ability to deter external interference in what Beijing considers internal territorial 
matters. Additionally, as oil is Beijing’s most prominent offshore economic interest,168 
the PLAN’s capacity to secure vital sea lanes over which resources are transported is a 
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defining task in the PLAN’s modernization. With territorial claims that lie beyond the 
accepted norm of international law and a rapaciously hungry economy, Beijing has 
presented its navy with a significant challenge.  
Although China’s military has a traditionally continental orientation, the PLAN 
has successfully utilized Mao’s “active defense” to define a strategy at sea that both 
serves to define China’s maritime boundary and provides a justifying narrative for 
increased allocation of resources to the PLAN. The United States presents the perfect 
antagonist within the “active defense” paradigm. As China is the weaker power, a short-
term goal that directs the PLAN’s modernization is the ability to threaten U.S. naval 
power, particularly aircraft carriers, with a strategic defense centered on submarine and 
surface forces. The PLAN’s modernization in these areas directly reflects Beijing’s desire 
for the PLAN to act as an anti-access force.169 In the longer-term, the very forces used to 
prevent interference near shore, and particularly in the case of a conflict with Taiwan, 
will have the capacity to sortie further from shore in order to protect SLOCs and distant 
maritime resource interests.170 The increase in China’s surface AAW capability would 
permit a PLAN task force to deny an opposing land-based or maritime force the ability to 
freely challenge Chinese movement in distant regions with air power. Developments in 
the PLAN’s surface and submarine forces clearly indicate that Beijing is planning to 
leverage its naval force to prevent others from interfering with China’s broader maritime 
strategy of sea lane security and maritime resource development.  
True command-of-the-sea is both difficult and too costly for Beijing to 
contemplate. While an aircraft carrier capability would increase China’s assessment of its 
comprehensive national power, the use of non-military tools within China’s “string of 
pearls” compensates by involving China directly in the maritime interests of other 
nations. Militarily, China has decidedly chosen to focus its PLAN modernization around  
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the principle of “sea denial.”171 The 2004 China’s National Defense white paper 
indicates that the more defensively oriented “sea denial” is a conscious choice within 
Beijing’s leadership: 
The PLA Navy is responsible for safeguarding China’s maritime security 
and maintaining the sovereignty of its territorial seas along with its 
maritime rights and interests. The Navy has expanded the space and 
extended the depth for offshore defensive operations.172 
While partly influenced by China’s traditionally defensive rhetoric, the idea of “offshore 
defensive operations” as an objective of the PLAN is matched by Beijing’s recent focus 
on submarine and near-shore defensive forces. Unable to challenge the predominant 
naval power of the time, the USN, the PLAN is ably developing its capacity to challenge 
the USN’s absolute freedom of movement at sea. To a degree, China is adjusting well to 
its inferior status. As Corbett notes: 
Where a Power was so inferior in naval force that it could scarcely count 
even on disputing command by fleet operations, there remained a hope of 
reducing the relative inferiority by putting part of the enemy’s force out of 
action.173 
A modern fleet built around the principle of “sea-denial” represents China’s hope 
of reducing the inferiority of the PLAN compared to the USN. With geographically 
defined strategic depth in the strategy of “offshore active defense” and a modern fleet of 
submarines and anti-access surface and missile forces, Beijing is building a force 
structure that will better allow China to delineate and enforce its maritime economic and 
sovereignty claims in the East and South China Seas. In time, the extension of maritime 
power along China’s vital SLOCs will increase as the PLAN slowly develops its blue-
water capabilities. 
The expansion of the PLAN due to a desire to challenge the USN’s absolute 
freedom of movement in the Western Pacific raises questions regarding how the United 
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States will respond to a perceived growing threat. Chinese security theorists are adamant 
that, in an age still dominated by great power politics, it is necessary for China to strive to 
develop a powerful fleet. In Beijing’s eyes, China’s economic growth is too important to 
rely upon international cooperation for the movement of resources. Chinese national 
security expert Ni Lexiong states:  
Those who believe we don’t need a strong navy because “international 
cooperation” is the only choice we have to guarantee our life line at sea 
are misguided in imagining a false premise, i.e., the world has irreversibly 
been marching toward an eternal peace. This is to use wishful thinking to 
replace “uncertainty.” China’s considerations for sea power strategy 
should not be based upon our wishful thinking, but on a realistically 
established sense of “uncertainty.” Based upon this understanding of our 
future’s uncertainty…it is China’s necessary choice to build up a strong 
sea power…we can now conclude that China must establish a strong 
Navy.174 
As the PLAN continues to grow, it will eventually present a significant threat to 
the USN. The increasing reach of China’s naval forces is a threat to which the USN must 
respond.175 How the United States and the USN respond will have an impact on greater 
East Asian security. 
To assess likely effects of China’s naval growth, a review of two historical case 
studies may shed light on general themes that occur when a dominant naval power is 
challenged by the expansion of a competitor nation’s fleet. Both pre-World War II Japan 
and pre-World War I Germany present two examples of growing economic powers that 
chose to expand a navy in order to guarantee various offshore interests. By reviewing the 
actions of both powers, as well as the reactions of their competitors, the United Kingdom 
and United States, general themes involved in naval arms races may present the United 
States with options in responding to the growth of the PLAN. 
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III.  THE RISE OF THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE NAVY, 1868-1941 
History is filled with multiple instances of a once minor player on the 
international stage that is able to transform itself into a central power. During the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Japan modernized and attained a dominant 
position among the regional powers of East Asia. Under increasing pressure from both 
domestic economic tensions and the forced opening of Japan by foreign powers, the 
Tokugawa Shogun ceded control of the country by late 1867. With the centralization of 
power under the Emperor Meiji’s name in 1868, the once feudal and isolated nation 
sought a new path that would guarantee the military, economic, and political status to 
ward off foreign powers. Over time, Japan’s growth heavily influenced its view of its 
rightful place amongst the nations of East Asia. From humble origins in the 1850s and 
1860s as a power subservient to Western diplomatic entreaties, pre-World War II Japan 
presented a formidable adversary that challenged the Asian interests of Western powers.  
Prior to World War II, there were debates within the Empire regarding how Japan 
could best take its rightful place in the world. Economic growth needed secure access to 
offshore resources and raw materials.  For Japan, a key means of enacting that policy was 
the dedicated effort to expand, modernize, and utilize the Imperial Navy. Japanese 
strategists foresaw that the Navy could be used to great national benefit. One explanation 
for why Japan sought to expand its navy has to do with the welcome reception within 
Japan of Alfred Thayer Mahan’s work The Influence of Seapower on History. Officer of 
Imperial Navy “inhaled deeply the heady…fumes of Mahan’s classic brew of 
imperialism and saltwater.”176 Mahan’s ideology of decisive seapower in the form of 
battle fleets appealed to Japan’s ambitions. Another, and less ideological, explanation of 
Japan’s naval rise posits an assessment of Japan’s immediate geopolitical situation as key 
to the growth of the Imperial Navy. By that interpretation, it is important to note: 
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The military weakness of Asia…the immense land and sea distances 
separating the region from important western…naval concentrations, the 
manner in which the Japanese islands commanded the western Pacific 
littoral and the numerous closely spaced islands leading…to the south – all 
these factors favored the success of maritime aggressions.177 
In order to grasp the varying forces that drove Japan’s naval growth, both 
ideological and practical concerns must be evaluated. 
The buildup of the Imperial Japanese Navy had a significant impact on the 
balance of power in pre-World War II East Asia. To understand both the nature of 
Japan’s naval growth and the response of competitive powers, it is necessary to first 
outline the context of Japan’s Meiji Restoration and the subsequent push for regional 
great power status and leadership. Once the broader background has been framed, the 
strategy Tokyo pursued to attain regional strength, as well as its impact on global affairs, 
will be outlined.  
A. MEIJI RESTORATION 
Japan’s rise following the restoration of the Meiji Emperor as head of state can be 
described as nothing less than stunning. In order to understand Japan’s maritime 
ambitions, the forces that allowed a cloistered, feudal state to transform into Asia’s most 
industrialized nation-state must be reviewed. 
1. Pre-Meiji Restoration 
Prior to the Meiji Restoration, Japan’s political structure can best be defined as a 
feudal system. With the emperor serving a symbolic role, control of the country fell to a 
military warlord, known as a shogun. Starting in 1603, the Tokugawa shogun served as 
Japan’s de facto ruler. Fearing external influences that could challenge internal rule, the 
shogunate successfully initiated an exclusionist policy. Only Chinese and Dutch East 
Indian merchants were allowed to gain access to Japan, and then only through a single 
port, Nagasaki. By the 1800s, Japan’s exclusion, coupled with unresponsive centralized 
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rule, created several significant issues. Economically, inflation had shifted wealth from 
the elite, the samurai, to the merchants and farmers. Attempts to curb economic issues did 
not address fundamental fiscal issues, and therefore “…innovative experiments more 
often than not simply ended up promoting chaos, shortages, and higher prices, the very 
economic dislocations that they had hoped to overcome.”178 These economic issues 
increased pressure on a rigid social order that did not readily accept change. Externally, 
the shogunate was faced with the challenge of Western powers imposing demands for 
access and trade. Starting with Commodore Matthew Perry and his squadron of “black 
ships,” Japan witnessed the superior technological and military might of foreign powers. 
Aware of China’s embarrassment at the hands of the British in the Opium Wars, the 
shogunate responded to United States Envoy Harris Townsend’s warnings “that Japan 
would do well to submit voluntarily to what it could not hope to avoid by resistance.”179 
Following several examples of Japan’s vulnerability, the Tokugawa recognized that 
“(r)esistance to foreign demands was clearly foolhardy.”180 The result of agreements with 
the United States, the United Kingdom, Netherlands, and France was internal discord 
amongst the shogun’s vassals (daimyo). Unable to quell internal discord and forced into 
agreements by foreign powers, the shogunate discovered that its foreign policy acted as 
“a kind of slow poison which gradually destroyed the bakufu [traditional government] by 
depriving it of its power of independent decisions.”181 By 1868, the shogun’s rule, 
considered inadequate to handle the challenges that Japan faced in the modern world, was 
replaced by the restoration of the Emperor Meiji to the leadership of Japan.  
2. After the Meiji Restoration 
Of the many challenges faced by the Meiji court, few were as immediate as the 
influence of foreign powers on the affairs of Japan. Most members of the imperial court 
were well aware that “Japan was independent in name but not independent in 
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practice.”182 The existence of foreign troops and the condition of extraterritoriality meant 
that, in practice, Japan had no authority over visitors within its borders. To reverse the 
humiliation and apparent weakness that had allowed unequal treaties to be forced upon 
the Japanese, the Meiji Court focused on the development of a powerful state capable of 
asserting Japan’s interests.183 As the Western powers were strong, the Meiji Court sought 
strength from Western teachers and advisers. Of fundamental importance to the Japanese 
was the need to create a “prosperous nation, strong military,” or fukoku kyohei. With that 
combination, Japan could correct the embarrassment that it had suffered under Western 
pressure. Beginning with industrialization and the training of a military by French and 
English advisors, the early Meiji successfully embarked upon a path to “provide a 
foundation of national strength so that the newly modernizing nation could escape the 
predatory threat of Western imperialism.”184 
3. The Role of National Unity 
One particular aspect of note during Japan’s early Meiji period was the drive to 
create a modern notion of national unity. Japan’s long isolation under the Tokugawa had 
created a deep sense of cultural unity. However, having few foreign nations with which to 
compare themselves, the Japanese did not develop a sense of nationalism. In order to 
motivate the populace at large, Japan’s intellectual and political leaders pushed the 
people to seek both, civilization and enlightment (bunmei kaika), as well as success 
(risshin shusse). Sold on the idea that “Japan had to ‘achieve its place,’ and it could best 
do so if its citizens achieved theirs,”185 the average citizen rallied to the idea that Japan 
could be great if the Japanese worked together “‘(f)or the sake of the country’ ”186 In the 
long run, the politics of naval expansion would rely upon Japan’s early establishment of a 
modern sense of nationhood. By 1868, Japan’s new naval leaders sought the authority 
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and support to “create impressive, awe-inspiring navy on a scale unmatched in East 
Asia…unlike anything Japan had ever possessed”187 with the hopes of fulfilling the 
Emperor’s guidance to unify the country with a strong military presence. Starting in the 
1880s, the national efforts to create a unified, modern state produced the beginnings of an 
official state ideology, known as kokutai. Loosely defined as “the distinctive character of 
Japan’s institutions and processes of government,”188 kokutai served to both remind the 
Japanese people of the uniqueness and endurance of their long-standing cultural 
institutions while imprinting a distinctively Japanese stamp on imported Western 
institutions. The appeals to kokutai served to remind the Japanese of their shared values, 
values that “had the general effect of promoting national solidarity in good causes as well 
as bad.”189 
B. JAPAN’S GEO-POLITICAL OUTLOOK, LATE NINETEENTH  – EARLY 
TWENTIETH CENTURIES 
Japan’s enforced interaction with the West, and the modernizing reforms that this 
inspired, caused its economy to grow at an impressive rate. An expanding population and 
industry were key factors in making Japan an emerging powerhouse in East Asia. For the 
leadership in the newly renamed Tokyo, success raised several concerns regarding 
relations with powers in both East Asia and the West. 
1. The Drive for National Strength 
Not considered a threat by Western powers, Japan showed signs of an ambition 
beyond that of a minor power. Embittered by their initial treatment, Japan’s public sector 
focused on economic development to fulfill the slogan of “prosperous nation, strong 
army.” Goals of varying importance drove governmental reform with the hope that 
“…the creation of a constitutional government…would preserve the sovereign powers of 
the emperor and unite the Japanese populace into a nation-state.”190 Economic 
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development and military modernization combined to shape early twentieth century 
Japan. On these two foundations, independence and revision of unequal treaties could be 
pursued, with the hope that Japan could fulfill its ultimate agenda of emulating the power 
and prestige of advanced Western nation-states.191 
a. Economic Concerns of Modernization 
The economic policies of the Meiji were almost entirely directed by the 
political goals of the regime. In 1871, in order to consolidate power internally, the Meiji 
regime assumed all debts of domains that acceded to its rule, and government driven land 
reform increased the value of land by freeing property as a capital asset.192 Both policies 
worked to consolidate domestic political support for the new regime. Following an 
economic downturn in the 1870s, adept financial retrenchment, led by finance minister 
Matsukata Masayoshi, served to create a stable yen and modernized banking system 
through lowered government expenditures, indirect taxation, and the privatization of 
government-owned industries. In the long term, Matsukata’s policies promoted a private-
sector owned manufacturing base that, between 1874 and 1894, increased output almost 
threefold.193 
Externally, however, the Meiji regime was faced with a conundrum: how 
to raise capital for modernization without falling to the predatory terms of foreign loans? 
The example of the British in China served as a cautionary tale to a nation eager for 
funds. The Meiji successfully limited large foreign loans to only two: an 1870 loan to 
build a Tokyo-Yokohama railway and an 1873 loan to guarantee central government 
solvency threatened by the assumption of regional debts. With relatively harsh repayment 
requirements initial foreign loans served to discourage subsequent attempts to borrow 
capital from abroad.194  The government learned quickly that Western powers might use 
economic excuses to exact further concessions, so repayment of these debts was a key 
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foreign policy concern of the 1870s and 1880s. Attempts by foreign powers to gain 
access within Japan beyond that agreed upon in initial treaties were routinely denied, as 
were attempts by foreign companies to dominate the coastal trade. Until the reforms of 
the 1880s, Japan staved off foreign control of its markets by the government promotion 
of light industries, such as textiles, and the export of specie. Government policy served to 
promote austerity and invest the profits of exports efficiently. Although many developing 
countries often see profits from the easy export of raw materials, in Japan “leaders 
resisted this temptation and struggled hard to maintain a more structurally balanced 
economy.”195 Their efforts laid the groundwork for the stability upon which Matsukata’s 
policies were built. The ultimate lesson for Japan, however, was to be wary of foreigner’s 
intent, and to build up the domestic economy. Only then could Western advances, 
advances that favored Western interests, be countered. 
b. Initial Naval Modernization 
Even as the Japanese economy struggled, military expenditures were 
perceived to be a necessary expenditure. Finance Minister Matsukata noted in 1881, “At 
this time when specie is scarce, we still must provide for essential expenditures like those 
of the army and navy…”196 The navy, however, was still considered subordinate to the 
army in national planning. From its subordinate position, the navy worked effectively to 
sell itself to the regime as a fundamental player in ensuring Japan’s place in the world. It 
was no secret to Japan’s leaders of the time that as “continental powers have the option 
of…retreating from the oceans, Japan enjoys no such luxury.”197  
Threats that could be approached only via the sea included Russia, China, 
and a China-dominated Korean peninsula. Coupled with fear of stronger powers on the 
Asian mainland, Japanese merchants and government officials alike became aware of 
undeveloped nations throughout Asia. As Western powers had exploited colonial 
                                                 
195 Tiedemann, “Japan’s Foreign Economic Policies, 1868-1893,” 129. 
196 Quoted in Tiedemann, “Japan’s Foreign Economic Policies, 1868-1893,” 140. 
197 Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, “Japanese Maritime Thought: If Not Mahan, Who?” Naval 
War College Review 59, no. 3 (Summer 2006): 25. 
 56
possessions for both resources for raw materials and export markets for manufactured 
goods, Japan looked to do the same in Southeast Asia. With a clear understanding that 
“only a navy could…protect Japanese interests in the vast Pacific Ocean, navy officers 
slowly formulated a strategic doctrine that emphasized…expansion in the South Seas.”198 
The ideology of southern advance (nanshin) served an important role in justifying an 
expanded naval budget: 
In May 1883, the government approved a plan that…added thirty-two 
warships over eight years at a cost of just over 26 million yen. This was no 
small amount…this sum virtually equaled the navy’s entire budget for the 
years between 1873 and 1882.199 
Combined with domestic clan politics, the nanshin served a central role in 
justifying early Japanese defense expenditures.  
Additionally, early Japanese planners looked to the still powerful fleets of 
China’s Qing dynasty as a major threat. By the late 1880s, “The principal naval concern 
of the Japanese…was to create a fleet able to oppose the Chinese…”200 Outwardly 
continental concerns contributed to the growing navy’s justification for expansion. 
Chinese naval expansion during the 1880s, itself a response to a defeat by a French naval 
force in 1884, spurred continued Japanese naval expenditures. Between 1874 and 1888, 
naval expenditures grew from 3.5 to 9.8 million yen . Proportionally, by the late 1880s 
the navy received between two-thirds and three-fourths of the army’s expenditures, up 
from as little as one-third in 1875.201  
The early Meiji-period Japanese Navy was developed for both economic 
and security reasons. Naval and government leaders both recognized that the navy served 
an important role nationally, creating an institution that “counted greatly in a country that 
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desperately required effective and efficient integration…to gain and retain the  
strength needed to ensure continued sovereignty.”202 
2. Foreign Policy 
As much as domestic unity and economic development may have concerned the 
Meiji regime, foreign policy was always a central feature in Japan’s political 
deliberations. To understand the centrality of the navy as an institution of national 
importance, a review of late nineteenth and early twentieth century relations with both 
East Asia and the Western powers is necessary. 
a. East Asia 
Of all of Japan’s concerns, the Korean peninsula was foremost in the mind 
of foreign policy elites. As Japan gained strength in the 1880s, the foreign minister, 
Mutsu Munemitsu, worried over Qing attempts to maintain influence within Korea. For 
Tokyo, the concern with Korea had little to do with resources and much to do with 
security. Mutsu was convinced that “if another country were to dominate the Korean 
peninsula, Japan’s safety would be endangered and Japan could not endure such a 
situation.”203 In 1876, Japan had forced Korea to sign the Treaty of Amity, which implied 
the end of the Qing dynasty’s patronage of Korea and opened the peninsula up to trade 
with other powers, of which Japan, by virtue of its proximity, was certain to be the most 
prominent. In 1885, an agreement between Beijing and Tokyo to notify each other of 
troop movements within Korea did little to assuage the tension over the region. Increased 
Russian interest in Manchuria and continued Chinese influence in Korea led many 
Japanese to believe “that war with China over Korea was inevitable.”204 By 1894, both 
countries moved troops into Korea in a move meant to contest the patronage of Korea. 
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At sea the Qing fleet had the advantage in numbers, but not in quality. In 
terms of armor, guns, tactics, and command, the Chinese fleet was poorly trained and 
obsolescent.205 Although concerned that significant losses against the Chinese “would be 
politically, militarily, and economically devastating to the navy and the nation,”206 a 
combined fleet under Admiral Ito Sukeyuki surged into the waters of Korea in July. The 
first naval engagement occurred five days before a formal declaration of war, establishing 
a “sequence of events – naval attack preceding an actual declaration of war – (that) 
became the pattern for the onset of each of the…major conflicts fought by modern 
Japan.”207 Following the defeat of the Qing’s Beiyang Fleet at the Battle of the Yalu, the 
Japanese established complete naval superiority over the Chinese. At the conclusion of 
the First Sino-Japanese War, the Treaty of Shimoseki effectively neutralized China as the 
dominant power in East Asia. Having forced China to cede control of Taiwan and the 
Liaodong peninsula on Manchuria, and having secured independence from China for 
Korea, Japan was undoubtedly the strongest nation in the region. The navy, modernized 
under Western models and tutelage, had proven its worth in defeating the supposedly 
superior Chinese Fleet.  
b. The West 
Japan sought to learn from the West in order to prevent any likely repeat 
of its rude introduction to the modern world. It was the very lesson “learned from the 
Western powers concern(ing) the importance in the modern world of national 
expansion”208 that would create tension between Japan and Western powers. 
With the United States, Japan experienced tension regarding the intrusion 
of American interests into what Tokyo perceived to be a properly Asian sphere. During 
the 1890s, Washington moved quickly to assert control over the Hawaiian Islands. 
Roughly 40 percent of the residents of Hawaii were of Japanese descent, ten times the 
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number of the white population. Regardless, in 1893, Americans on the island sought to 
hold the territory for American interests.  This event served as one in a number of 
“(s)igns of American expansion in the Pacific (that) naturally alarmed the Japanese 
government.”209 In spite of victories achieved during the Sino-Japanese War, the dispatch 
of a Japanese cruiser to Hawaii could not prevent ultimate annexation by the United 
States in 1898. A policy of overseas immigration promoted by the Meiji regime came to 
seem perilous if the navy was unable to protect the interests of Japanese far from home. 
Later that same year, American forces took possession of the Philippine Islands from 
Spain, as one of the fruits of its victory in the Spanish-American War. In response to the 
United States Navy’s impressive action far from home, “(t)he world’s admiralties took 
notice, and none more so than that of Japan.”210 Japan entered the twentieth century 
warily watching the growing industrial power of the United States. 
Japan was also concerned with the advance of Russian influence into the 
Asian Pacific region. Concerned about Japanese domination of access to China, Russia 
worked with Germany and France to challenge the validity of aspects of the Treaty of 
Shimoseki. Known as the Triple Intervention, the three powers demanded the Liaodong 
peninsula on southern Manchuria be returned to the Chinese. Under the guidance of 
Foreign Minister Mutsu, Japan ceded control as requested. Japan could not press for war 
as “Japan was militarily too weak and diplomatically too isolated…”211  Although the 
navy had performed admirably against the Chinese, Western powers were considered too 
powerful a foe. Vulnerable, but needing to isolate Russia, the instigator of Triple 
Intervention, Japan signed the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902. The alliance served both 
nations’ interests well; it “was precisely tailored to what both allies perceived as the 
major threat in the Far East: a Franco-Russian combination.”212 For Japan, in particular, 
the alliance served to counter growing Russian influence in Korea. The terms of the 
alliance served to deter the entry of any other European power into a possible Russo-
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Japanese conflict, by requiring that Great Britain then enter the war on the side of Japan 
— a prospect particularly aversive to the French. As Russia introduced troops into 
Manchuria and Korea in 1902 and 1903, war with Russia seemed inevitable. During the 
prelude to conflict, the navy took stock of its development since 1895 and was confident 
in its capabilities: 
The planners of the Japanese navy recognized…that the relative situations 
of Japan and Russia would make any conflict between them regional 
rather than global…the war would…be restricted to northeast Asia, a fact 
that…worked to the disadvantage of the Russian navy in terms of 
geography and distance.213 
Through preparation and solid execution, the Japanese fleet, composed of 
slightly superior ships in quality even though lesser in quantity, performed admirably at 
the Battle of the Yellow Sea and the Battle of Tsushima. Admiral Togo Heihachiro’s 
forces secured a decisive victory at the latter battle.  With 21 Russian ships sunk, seven 
captured, 4830 Russian sailors killed, and 5917 captured, it is safe to say that “(t)he 
Tsushuma battle was an annihilation with scarcely a parallel in the history of modern sea 
warfare.”214 So great was the navy’s victory that British naval theorist Sir Julian Corbett 
commented that Tsushima was “the most decisive and complete naval victory in 
history.”215 As a result of the Russo-Japanese War, Japan gained control of the Liaodong 
peninsula, the southern Manchuria railroad, and patronage of Korea. The American-
brokered Treaty of Portsmouth served to elevate Japan to the level of Great Power; never 
before in modern times had an Eastern power defeated a Western power.  The navy’s role 
in securing victory was central, and would serve to promote naval expansion in the 
decades to come. 
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C. MATCHING ENDS AND MEANS: CHOOSING A STRATEGY 
As Japan faced its future in the early 1900s, it was apparent that a military policy 
was needed that would ensure the long-term well-being of Japan as an emerging great 
power in East Asia. Devising a maritime strategy that could help ensure that well-being 
was a central concern for Tokyo. In choosing a strategy, it was important for Japan’s 
leaders – at a minimum – implicitly to recall that “maritime strategy is the direction of all 
aspects of national power that relate to a nation’s interests at sea…maritime strategy is 
not purely a naval preserve.”216 Japan had external problems for which the navy appeared 
to be an ideal solution, but others for which the navy seemed to best fill the secondary 
role of support to the army. Internal and bureaucratic issues were also of concern. Tokyo 
had to take into account its own condition, as well as its external aims, and implement a 
maritime strategy that would be suitable for the needs of the nation.  
1. Japan’s Options 
As Tokyo reviewed its situation following the Russo-Japanese War, it was 
apparent that two naval powers could challenge the Imperial Japanese Navy’s 
prominence in East Asia – the Royal Navy and the United States Navy. Thankfully for 
Japan, the British, following the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902, were allied with the 
Japanese and were nullified as a risk. The United States Navy appeared to be the force 
that most threatened Japanese maritime hegemony. Following the Spanish-American 
War, the United States had acquired control of Guam and the Philippines, two territories 
that placed Washington’s interests amongst Tokyo’s Asian concerns. Additionally, anti-
Japanese sentiment on America’s West Coast following the Russo-Japanese War served 
to orient Japan’s military against American interests. With the passage of the emperor-
approved Imperial National Defense Policy (IMDP) of 1907, the United States was 
directly identified as the most likely enemy Japan would face in the near future. Utilized 
by the Navy Ministry to justify defense expenditures, the IMDP was accompanied by a 
Naval Strength Requirement that outlined an “eight-eight” fleet plan – eight battleships 
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and eight armored cruisers with no ship more than eight years old.217 As the 1920s 
approached, Tokyo faced a conundrum that would dictate the future of naval policy: 
would a growing naval strength ensure Japan’s East Asian supremacy against the United 
States, or was there another method more amenable to Japan’s national situation? 
a. Treaties and Naval Arms Limitations 
Although the “eight-eight” plan of 1907 seemed to fit the needs of Japan’s 
IMDP, the economic reality of building the ideal fleet led to internal dissent. Chief 
amongst the dissenters was the Navy Minister, Admiral Kato Tomosaburo. Kato 
recognized the difficulty of meeting the “eight-eight” plan’s goal of creating a navy 
second-to-none in East Asia. By 1919, Kato admitted to a Diet budget subcommittee that, 
“…if we should try to compete with the United States, it is a foregone conclusion that we 
are simply not up to it.”218 Fearing Washington’s interference with Japan’s interests on 
the Asian mainland, but aware of the limitations Japan had regarding the ability to 
challenge the United States’ maritime strength, Tokyo chose to mitigate the threat from 
the United States by improving relations with Washington. As the senior negotiator for 
Japan at the American-initiated Washington Naval Conference of 1921-1922, Admiral 
Kato was able to enact a policy that accurately reflected greater Japan’s assessment that 
“its weak economy could not yet afford to indulge in naval building that was competitive 
with the United States.”219 Kato ignored the Foreign Ministry’s instructions to accept 
nothing less than a ratio of 70 percent and agreed to a capital ship ratio between the 
United Kingdom, the United States, and Japan of 10:10:6. Defining a capital ship as any 
vessel greater than 10,000 tons or with larger than eight-inch guns, the Five-Power 
Treaty, signed in early 1922, allowed Japan to have ten capital ships with a total 
displacement of 301,320 tons, while the United States and Great Britain would each have 
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eighteen capital ships totaling 500,650 tons.220 Kato’s willingness to agree to a ratio less 
than what his countrymen wanted was conditioned by a single point; Kato “felt that the 
question of America’s advance bases in the Philippines and Guam was more crucial to 
Pacific strategy than hairsplitting bargains over fleet ratios.”221 In the treaty, the United 
Kingdom, United States, and Japan agreed to cease fortifying any territorial holdings in 
the Pacific. In the end, although the capital ship ratio was not what Tokyo had desired, 
the Five-Power Treaty of the Washington Conference seemed an ideal containment 
strategy for Japan due to its limitations on base development. With no developed bases in 
the Far East, if Washington found itself at war with Tokyo: 
…the United States would have to fall back to the Hawaiian Islands as its 
base of operations. Japan would have enough strength to defend 
itself…the Five-Power Treaty left the Japanese navy dominant in Far 
Eastern waters…From the viewpoint of naval strategy, the settlement was 
a great success for Japan.222  
Initially, the use of naval arms limitations appeared to provide Japan with 
a long-term strategy for mitigating the threat of an intrusive United States fleet in Far 
Eastern waters. 
While the use of naval arms limitations appeared to serve Tokyo’s greater 
interests, many of Japan’s senior naval leaders felt that Admiral Kato had curtailed 
Japanese naval strength during a crucial period in Japanese expansion. Admiral Kato 
Tomosaburo’s efforts in Washington were viewed as a significant step in normalizing 
Japan’s position in world affairs, and he was rewarded with elevation to the position of 
Prime Minister. Another Kato, Admiral Kato Kanji, returned from the Washington Naval 
Conference with a much different view of the proceedings. For Admiral Kato Kanji, 
deputy to Kato Tomosaburo during the conference, any ratio of Japanese capital ships 
below 70 percent was untenable. He saw 70 percent as “a symbol of Japan’s defensive 
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posture, and a major concession,”223 and believed that the Five-Power Treaty that 
authorized 60 percent relative standing stood as a symbol of institutionalized Japanese 
weakness. Assigned as head of the Naval General Staff in the 1920s, Kato Kanji’s 
opinion regarding fleet readiness pointed to the debilitating effect of the Treaty system;  
he “increasingly placed the blame for Japan’s naval unpreparedness on the Washington 
Treaty agreement on capital ships…he felt Japan should have, in  principle…a ratio of 
10:10 with other Powers.”224  
Kato Kanji’s anger was reflected within portions of the navy’s officer 
corps. The long-term effect of that anger would be the formation of a schism between 
administrative officers within the Navy Ministry and operationally oriented officers 
within the Naval General Staff. By the time of the London Naval Conference in 1930, 
Kato Kanji’s “fleet faction” had enough internal and popular support to challenge the 
legitimacy of the naval arms limitations. At London, the United Kingdom and United 
States successfully negotiated with the Japanese to extend capital ship ratios to cruisers 
and submarines. Within Japan, the extension of the 10:6 ratio was seen by the public as 
“an insult to Japan’s status as a first-rate power and a grave threat to its defenses.”225 
Admiral Kato Kanji’s concern that “the American effort to capture the China market 
would spell an eventual clash with Japan”226 hinted at the widespread belief within the 
navy that conflict with the United States was inevitable; Japan had to prepare for war as 
best it could, not rely upon the good intention of treaties. Limiting naval strength, a sign 
of subservience to Western demands, was not palatable to the Japanese people. To 
understand if the Japanese navy took to expansion as a strategic  principle, it is important 
to review how the evangelist of late-nineteenth century maritime power, Alfred Thayer 
Mahan, was received in the East. 
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b. Mahan 
At the same time that Japan was modernizing the force that would face the 
Qing, Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote his first and most famous work, The Influence of 
Seapower Upon History 1660-1783. In terms of theory, Mahan revolutionized formal 
work in naval theory by forming “an ideology grounded in the notion that naval power 
was the most decisive factor in the political and economic rise and fall of nations.”227 
Recognizing the role of commerce as vital to a nation’s well-being, Mahan identified the 
purpose of a navy: “The necessity of a navy…springs, therefore, from the existence of a 
peaceful shipping, and disappears with it…”228 Commerce required protection from 
commerce raiders, and Mahan saw the means to provide protection in a fleet that could 
guarantee freedom of movement over the maritime domain via command of the seas. As 
opposing forces would hold similar views, it was important to recognize that a fleet 
designed to protect trade would need to eliminate the threat of an opposing fleet. In 
Mahan’s words, “in war the proper main objective of the navy is the enemy’s navy.”229 
The Japanese experience during the Russo-Japanese War seemed to 
validate the Mahanian idea that naval warfare ultimately consisted of the engagement of 
large fleets of capital ships to determine the command of the sea. Even before that 
conflict, Japanese naval leaders “urged readers of the Japanese translation ‘to study it 
(The Influence of Seapower Upon History) and strive so that the Japanese Empire can 
secure sea power in the Pacific.’”230 Justifying a large fleet based on a historical study of 
England, however, proved a difficult task. Instead of the broad sweep of universal theory 
put forward by Mahan, Japan’s leaders sought “an explanation of sea power that might 
use Western historical examples, but that was directed to the Japanese situation, which 
was regional and particular.”231 Experience proved the better guide than Mahan’s 
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theories. By 1910, Japan had more experience than any other major power in the 
employment of modern naval forces. Instead of a constructive guide, Mahan provided a 
useful framework within which naval force could be explained. Many of Japan’s naval 
leaders “read Mahan’s works selectively…using his ideas to ratify preconceived ideas 
about how Japan should configure and use its navy.”232 More often than not, it was the 
translation of Mahan into Japanese that “provided a weighty and sophisticated theory that 
Japan’s navalists could use to assert their primacy in budgetary appropriations in 
competition with the army.”233  Japan’s experiences against the Qing and the Russians 
had provided a wealth of experience and knowledge in naval warfare. While assisting 
with the selling of the Japanese Navy and arguing its case for funds, Mahan’s writings 
were not the defining feature of naval strategy for pre-World War II Japan. To best 
understand the maritime strategy of Japan, it is important to look at the pressing material 
needs of the navy and the event that best crystallized the importance of resources: World 
War I. 
c. Resources, World War I, and Economic Necessity 
Aside from the prospect of arms limitations within international 
frameworks or the theoretical outlines of Mahanian naval doctrine, Japan faced 
significant resource access issues that shaped its strategic outlook. No event made the 
danger of a lack of resources more apparent than World War I. Before World War I, 
neutral nations had stood aside and provided finance and resources as belligerents faced 
off: 
This pattern was abruptly altered in the summer of 1915, when…World 
War I’s initial autumn offensives gave way to grinding trench 
warfare…There were no neutrals…belligerents who were not self-reliant 
were lost…it was no longer enough that Japan was able to construct its 
own warships and artillery pieces. The nation now needed secure access to 
iron ore and other necessary items.234 
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Tokyo recognized the danger in relying upon others to assist in ensuring 
Japan’s economic well-being. The initial experiences with the West had revealed the self-
serving motives of supposedly universally beneficent and physically mandated free-
market access. Two wars, one with China and the other with Russia, had shaped the 
external perception of Japan; to guarantee possession of what one needed, war was often 
the necessary course of action. World War I confirmed that lesson in stark and 
uncompromising terms. Within Japan, “the expectations of prolonged war and its 
economic demands led to greater national investment in industrial expansion…and 
territorial expansion aimed at acquiring and developing raw materials…”235 
For the Imperial Japanese Navy, the requirement to secure resources was 
more narrowly translated. Although the Royal Navy had been a dominant force during 
World War I, the utilization of submarines against shipping had nearly crippled England. 
Japanese navalists recognized that “(w)hat was true for Britain was double true for Japan 
– especially in the case of oil.”236 Whereas Japan, and particularly interests in the 
Japanese Army, turned increasingly during the 1920s and 1930s towards the Asian 
mainland “to meet its needs and relieve some its dependence on Western imports, Japan’s 
interests came increasingly into direct conflict with those of the Western Powers.”237 
Searching for an alternative, the Navy would advance a different idea – one that 
expanded Japanese influence not into the Asian mainland but to the islands to the South. 
With the technological shift from coal to oil powered warships, the need to ensure access 
to oil only increased throughout the 1920s and 1930s.  
At the time of the Washington Conference in 1921, most of Japan’s oil 
was imported from the United States. The only other source of oil close to Japan was the 
Dutch East Indies.238 The need for oil resources transformed the Navy’s southward 
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orientation from simply a justification for greater budgetary expenditures into a truly 
convincing strategic concern.  Hoping for both a means to secure natural resources and 
provide a justifying strategy for the growth of a large fleet, “Japan’s search for a secure 
source of natural resources would lead it to expand southward into Southeast Asia.”239 
That expansion required a fleet that could protect access to markets only accessible from 
the sea, markets that overlapped with, and were thought threatened by, the presence of 
Western powers. The Western power that remained foremost in the mind of the Imperial 
Japanese Navy was the United States. In the end, it took the lesson of World War I 
regarding the absolute necessity to control one’s own resources, combined with the 
lessons of Japan’s two naval warfare experiences, to convince Japan’s naval leadership to 
strive for a fleet second to none – one that would ensure the dominance of Japan in the 
Western Pacific.  
D. IMPACT OF AN EXPANDING MARITIME STRATEGY 
Japan’s options for a Maritime Strategy intertwined throughout the 1920s and 
1930s. Not until the late 1930s did the necessity of geographic expansion dominate the 
strategic thinking of Japan’s navalists. How the varying options impacted both the 
internal and external affairs of Japan is an important factor in understanding the impact of 
Japan’s expanding maritime strategy. 
1. Internal Influences 
a. Army vs. Navy Politics 
Since its inception in 1869, the Imperial Japanese Navy had struggled to 
emerge from the shadow of the Army. As important as naval victories during the Sino-
Japanese War and Russo-Japanese had been to determining success in war, “(u)p until 
1910, the navy had lost out to the army in the share obtained of the national budget; naval 
strength had been difficult to develop.”240 With general concern for resource access 
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increasing throughout the 1910s and 1920s, the army and navy engaged in a debate 
regarding the appropriate direction for national policy. The notion of an orientation to the 
Asian landmass, or northern advance (hokushin-ron), was championed by the Army 
General Staff. A senior member of the Army General Staff, Tanaka Giichi, argued that 
“we must disengage ourselves from the restrictions of an island nation to become a state 
with continental interests.”241 Directly opposed to the continental orientation was the 
maritime orientation best outlined in naval theorist Sato Tetsutaro’s Teikoku Kokuboron 
(On Imperial National Defense). Sato worked to modify “Mahan’s sea power theory to 
Japan’s geopolitical situation and strategic realities”242 in order to advocate for increased 
naval budgets and the necessity of a southward, maritime orientation (nanshin-ron). Up 
through the 1930s, these two forces would cripple Japan’s strategic planning as 
“interservice infighting and…contention for a larger share of budget of war materiel 
accompanied formulation of any major national defense policies.”243 
In the 1930s, to ensure its share of the budget, navy advocates jittisoned 
whatever remnants of strategic moderation existed within the Navy Ministry. Arguing 
that the provisions of the 1930 London Naval Treaty violated the Naval General Staff’s 
overall authority over the navy, a position that challenged the Navy Ministry’s oversight 
of force structure, the chief of the Staff, Admiral Kato Kanji, resigned in protest. From 
that point on, naval officers were divided into two camps. The first, the “fleet faction,” 
followed the lead of Kato Kanji and strove to overturn any constraints on naval budgets 
and growth. The second, the “treaty faction,” saw naval arms limitations as providing 
necessary security guarantees against the threat of Western powers. Ultimately, the 
response to the London Naval Treaty “poisoned the delicate civil-military relationship 
that had existed in the past”244 and helped to radicalize relations between the army and 
navy through the ascent of “fleet faction” officers to the highest levels of the Naval 
General Staff. In the end, the Naval General Staff was given greater power over 
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administrative issues than that of the Navy Ministry, a situation that allowed the operators 
of Japan’s fleet to serve as the proponents of a larger naval budget in Diet negotiations. 
As the 1940s approached, the radicalization of naval administration acted as a catalyst 
that necessitated increased naval budgets concomitant with the army’s funding; service 
politics, not strategy, drove what other powers interpreted, with good reason, as Japan’s 
belligerent intentions.  
Finally, it is important to note how “Fleet faction” officers were disturbed 
by the army’s 1931 occupation of Manchuria. As the army required funding to ensure a 
force capable of securing Japan’s interests in Manchuraia, the navy recognized its 
debilitated bureaucratic position due to the handicapping Treaty system. Opponents of the 
treaty system were so displeased with the London Treaty that, in 1932, naval cadets, 
sympathetic to withdrawal from the treaty system, assassinated Prime Minister Inuki 
Tsuyoshi in his residence. The relatively light sentences of the parties indicated the 
weakness of civilian oversight of military affairs and “proved to be a death blow to party 
government.”245 
b. Economics and Expenditures 
The Great Depression that began in 1929 had a significant impact on 
strategic thinking in Japan, as it did in every other great power. As financial markets 
seized and capital froze, export markets worldwide were impacted as nation-states sought 
to protect domestic industry. Between 1929 and 1931, Japan’s exports fell by 43 percent, 
a drop that pushed many within the government to argue “that ‘economic warfare’ was 
leading to the creation of ‘large economic blocs,’ thereby making it necessary for Japan 
to create one…in order to survive.”246 For military decision makers, including the Naval 
General Staff, “the dangers faced by Japan…could best be met by political and military 
intervention on behalf of economic rights.”247 The voice of industry, represented in the 
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internationalist-oriented Foreign Ministry, lost much of its mitigating effect on military 
adventurism as the drop in exports translated into a half million lost jobs between 1929 
and 1932.248 Within the urban working-class, “(t)here emerged a new…generation that 
lost confidence in the industrial process and in political parties seeming to be in the 
pockets of manufacturers and traders.”249 The ill-fated financial policies of Finance 
Minister Inoue Junnosuke negatively colored the ideas of moderating forces within Japan. 
A return to the international gold-standard for financial exchanges, an event that proved 
disastrous for Japan’s financial markets, occurred immediately prior to the start of the 
Great Depression in 1929. For Japan’s ruling class, “(h)ad it not been for the Depression, 
the civilian politicians…might conceivably have retained the upper hand in Tokyo.”250 
Instead, it seemed clear that Japan had to control its economic destiny by taking control 
of markets by force. This required larger expenditures on the military, and the navy, 
although constrained in part by the limits of the 1922 Five-Power and 1930 London 
Naval Treaties, lobbied extensively for increased funding. Although the naval budget had 
dropped from its 1921 high of 502 million Yen (31.6 percent of the total national budget) 
to a post-Washington Conference low of 240 million Yen (14.4 percent of the national 
budget) in 1926, efforts by the Navy succeeded in increasing the budget to 583 million 
Yen (24.1 percent of the national budget) by 1936.251 The understood need to prepare the 
military to ensure exclusive access to Japanese-controlled markets served to effectively 
reverse the decreased spending of the Washington Treaty system. Japan’s choice to 
guarantee market access directly correlated into a larger and more ominous naval force. 
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2. External Influences and Effects 
a. China and Japan’s International Relations 
Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the increased emphasis on economic 
independence, or autarky, played a central role in Japan’s orientation towards China. 
Following the Triple Intervention’s successful effort to deny the Liaotung Peninsula to 
Japanese control following the Sino-Japanese War, Tokyo had been concerned about the 
efforts of Western powers to limit Japan’s interests within China. An “open door” policy, 
put forward by Washington in 1899, sought to limit any power’s, but particularly Japan’s, 
attempts to carve up China into externally-controlled regions. Following Japan’s World 
War I assumption of Germany’s Asian possessions, including the Caroline Islands and 
China’s Shandong peninsula, Japan fought to have other powers recognize the legitimacy 
of Japan’s claims in China. Japan’s apparent desire to dominate China was a significant 
reason for the calling of the Washington Naval Conference in 1921. With the signing of 
the Nine-Power Treaty: 
…treaty signatories…pledged themselves not to undertake further 
expansion at the expense of China. Instead, they would co-operate to 
restore to it a measure of independence so that in time it would emerge as 
a stabilizing factor…China was a key to the successful functioning of the 
new system.252 
Although a signatory to the treaty, Tokyo recognized and resented the 
efforts of other nations to curtail Japan’s “special interests” in China.  
The combination of a desire for autarky following the onset of the Great 
Depression and the negative naval and domestic responses towards the London Naval 
Treaty of 1930 pointed Tokyo towards a path of increased international isolation. By 
1930, a resurgent Republic of China, led by Chiang Kai-Shek, was working to end the 
long-standing treaty port system, a system that had been imposed by external powers to 
garner benefits at the expense of China. Although Japanese diplomats worked “to 
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preserve Japan’s claims to privilege in China at a time when the…system was being 
abandoned by others as unworkable in the face of Chinese hostility,”253 Tokyo held out 
the possibility of asserting Japan’s interests with the backing of military force. Having 
established explicit special interests in Manchuria following the actions of the Kwantung 
Army at the Mukden Incident of 1931, Tokyo did not look favorably upon a League of 
Nations’ assessment of Japan’s actions. Known as the Lytton Report, “the verdict…was 
unmistakable: acceptance of the Report by the League Assembly would amount to a vote 
of censure on Japan.”254 As previously outlined, Japanese policy makers saw the need to 
guarantee economic assets as the preeminent lesson of the early 1930s; no amount of 
external pressure could make Tokyo ignore that point. As Japan had already 
diplomatically recognized its puppet state of Manchukuo in late 1932, the mid-1933 vote 
of censure by the League of Nations simply gave Japan the excuse it needed to leave the 
League for good. With the “fleet faction’s” opinion that the entire Washington Treaty 
System, to include the Five-Power Treaty and the London Naval Treaty, “seriously 
jeopordiz(ed) national defense, (and) must not be allowed to last long,”255 Japan 
withdrew from the naval arms limitations regime and found itself diplomatically 
unhindered to promote its naval growth. Tokyo’s interest in China’s natural resources and 
markets translated into Japan’s exclusion from the limiting effects of multi-lateral arms 
control regimes. Within that context, the navy found itself free to argue for the necessity 
of increased budgets and fleet expansion.  
Although the Imperial Navy continued to worry about the U.S. ambitions, 
the army, as the guarantor of Japan’s interests within China, was primarily concerned 
with the threat of the Soviet Union. While Japan had declared war on Germany in World 
War I and taken possession of Germany’s Asian possessions, the threat of the Soviet 
Union motivated Japan and Germany to sign the Anti-Comintern Pact of 1936.  In short, 
“(t)he argument in favor of Japan moving closer to Germany was the threat she felt from 
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the Soviet Union to her continental territories.”256 That threat was realized when Soviet 
and Japanese forces clashed in Mongolia in 1939. The drive to ensure resource access in 
Manchuria was seriously challenged as “(t)he Kwantung Army sustained crushing defeats 
and learned that its equipment, tactics, and organization were seriously inadequate for 
any war with the Russians.”257 For proponents of the navy, the inability of the army to 
deal effectively with the Soviet threat to Manchuria coupled with the outbreak of war 
between Germany and other Western powers to provide an opportunity to realize the 
supremacy of the navy in military planning. Naval leaders viewed Germany’s 1940 
victories as “an opportunity to drive the Western powers out of Southeast Asia and finally 
create an autarkic Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere.”258 A proponent of the 
southern advance strategy, Captain Nakahara Yoshimasa, assessed Japan’s overall 
strategic outlook and noted that, “(t)he important thing is to take this opportunity to 
reorient Japan as a sea power and concentrate its efforts on naval expansion.”259 With the 
prospect of gaining resources from territories gathered under a Japanese-led Co-
Prosperity Sphere, a thinly veiled ideology that advocated Japanese imperial interests in 
the Western Pacific, naval leaders renewed an already expansive building program and 
sought to extend Japan’s reach into regions once thought to be exclusively under the 
domain of the West. In so doing, Japan entered into direct conflict with the Western 
powers most involved in Asian affairs – the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and, most 
ominously, the United States.  
Predicated on the need for resources to guarantee an autarkic economic 
system, Japan’s expansion into China in the 1920s and 1930s led to international 
isolation. For its part, the Imperial Navy served as both cheerleader and proponent for 
policies intended to ensure Japan’s political and economic autonomy from external 
interference – policies that served to highlight the country’s need for an expanding 
maritime strategy. Based on that strategy, naval leaders continued to argue for larger 
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budgets and a growing fleet. With the growth of the fleet, the Imperial Japanese Navy 
appeared more and more as a dominant threat to American interests in the Western 
Pacific. 
b. The United States Navy 
As previously outlined, American interest in Japan’s activity in China, 
highlighted by the enunciation of the “Open Door” policy, shaped Washington’s foreign 
policy as early 1899. The United States Navy’s interest in the Imperial Japanese Navy’s 
actions was only heightened by the outcome of Russo-Japanese War. At the end of the 
war, many American strategists held definitive views regarding the future of East Asia: 
“…American planners continued to regard the province (Manchuria) as ripe for plucking. 
Japan was the only conceivable transgressor.”260 The American navy’s recognition of 
Japan’s rising military power coincided with an unfortunate domestic incident. Amidst 
the social chaos that followed the San Francisco earthquake of 1906, overt racism against 
Japanese immigrants resulted in the passage of segregationist education and property 
rights laws – laws in direct violation of treaties between Washington and Tokyo. 
Combined with the new political realities of East Asia, the international tension that 
resulted convinced many American naval planners to consider Japan as a likely future 
foe. The result was the initiation of an extended military planning process whose product 
was known as War Plan Orange. Up to the start of World War II in the Pacific, War Plan 
Orange would serve to focus the strategic and procurement efforts of the United States 
Navy. While other plans existed, Orange acted to focus those efforts on the key potential 
enemy of the United States Navy – the Imperial Japanese Navy. 
By the time naval arms limitation treaties were appearing to falter in the 
mid-1930s, the United States had scrapped a total of 842,000 tons of warships to Japan’s 
193,000 tons.261 With the arrival of President Franklin Roosevelt to the White House, a 
reversal in course occurred. Faced with the debilitating effects of the Great Depression, 
                                                 
260 Edward S. Miller, War Plan Orange: the U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945 (Annapolis, 
MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991), 24 
261 Rose, The Breaking Storm, 62. 
 76
Roosevelt asked for funds to increase the fleet by almost fifty ships of varying classes. 
The budget increase was partly intended to provide jobs for shipbuilders as part of the 
New Deal recovery effort, a fact that caused Senator Gerald P. Nye to comment that the 
increase in naval construction was “a bill for the relief of the munitions makers of the 
United States.”262 While domestic economic conditions motivated the Executive to 
increase naval appropriations, they were not the only factor: 
Franklin Roosevelt would have had a harder task in persuading Congress 
to fund the resurgence of the United States Navy…without the seemingly 
willful disregard toward the cause of peace or arms limitations displayed 
by an increasingly truculent Imperial Navy.263 
Enacted via the 1934 Vinson-Trammell Act, American naval expansion 
sought to authorize the building of warships up to the treaty limits of the Five-Power 
Treaty and London Naval Conference. This action was thought necessary due to Japan’s 
growing aggression in Asia, aggression demonstrated through the Japanese establishment 
of the state of Manchukuo in Manchuria, and Japan’s withdrawal from the League of 
Nations. In reference to Washington’s Open Door policy and support for the Washington 
Conference, then-Chief of Naval Operations Admiral William H. Standley noted, “If we 
desire to give adequate support to the policies which we have been following in the 
past…then we must possess adequate naval force.”264 Japan responded to the Vinson-
Trammell Act by seeking to expand its fleet with a “Second Supplemental building 
program.” By 1935, the initial stages of a naval arms race had begun. 
The confirmation of a naval arms race was made at the Second London 
Naval Conference of 1935-1936. The Japanese delegation, led by Kato Kanji disciple 
Nagano Osami, had specific instructions to seek naval tonnage parity with the United 
Kingdom and United States. For naval leaders in Tokyo, “Parity was absolutely 
necessary…for the Imperial Navy to control the western Pacific, protect vital sea 
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communications, and secure Japan’s position as a stabilizing power in East Asia.”265 
Withdrawal by Japan from the Washington Naval Treaty was a near certainty due to 
Tokyo’s refusal to accept what Washington and London sought – a Japanese navy ratio 
that ensured an Imperial Navy fleet smaller than that of the United States Navy and Royal 
Navy. The Japanese delegation left the Second London Conference early, concurrently 
notifying the other powers it would no longer follow the guidelines of naval arms 
limitation treaties. With that, the United States confirmed its concerns that Japan sought 
naval dominance in the Pacific. From 1936 onward, naval expansion would escalate 
tension between the United States and Japan.  
Unfortunately for Japan, it was in a poor position to challenge the United 
States in an outright arms race. The Japanese invasion of China in 1937, along with the 
incidental sinking of the USS Panay by Japanese forces, coincided with Japan’s “Third 
Replenishment Program,” an attempt to expand the Imperial Japanese Navy by sixty-six 
ships, including two Yamato-class battleships. Japanese strategists hoped that an 
emphasis on very large capital ships would “intimidate and demoralize Western 
admiralties and navy departments to the point that Japan would be given the free hand in 
East Asia and the western Pacific that it insisted upon.”266 In response, the United States 
passed a Second Vinson-Trammell Act in 1938 with the intent of expanding its fleet by 
20 percent. Japan again responded with a “Fourth Replenishment Program” in 1939, a 
plan that included eighty more ships. Once more, however, the United States, partially in 
response to Japan’s continuing naval expansion and partially in response to the 
Germany’s assault on England, responded with both a Third Vinson Plan and the Stark 
Plan, a move to establish a two-ocean fleet. In all, the plans provided for a 70 percent 
increase in the fleet; the 2 million additional ship tons planned for by the Americans 
totaled four times the tonnage of the Japanese Third and Fourth Replenishment Plans 
combined.267  
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During the 1930s, Japan found that the United States was more than 
willing to match Tokyo’s increases in naval expenditures. While initial spending merely 
brought the United States Navy’s fleet up to the limits allowed by the Washington Treaty 
system, Washington was more than ready to go beyond those limits. Unfortunately for 
Japan, “not only were the most ambitious schemes beyond the capacity of Japanese 
industry to realize…they were doomed to be overtaken…by both the size and efficiency 
of the American shipbuilding industry.”268 Aside from shipbuilding capacity, Japan 
simply did not have the budget to match American defense spending. In 1937, the United 
States spent 1.5 percent of $68 billion in national income, or $1.02 billion, on defense, 
while Japan devoted 28 percent of $4 billion, or $1.12 billion, on defense spending.269 
While Japan’s spending was quantitatively higher, it is apparent that the United States 
had a much greater production potential than Japan. To the Japanese navy’s 
consternation, the American naval expansions of the late 1930s and 1940 transformed 
that potential into practice. One naval historian put Japan’s inferiority in the starkest 
terms: 
Such was the scale of American industrial power that if during the Pearl 
Harbor attack the Imperial Navy had been able to sink every major unit of 
the entire U.S. Navy and then complete its own construction 
programs…by mid-1944 it would still not have been able to put to sea a 
fleet equal to the one the Americans could have assembled in the 
intervening thirty months.270  
Faced with a behemoth that it had challenged and could not defeat, 
Japanese naval planners were forced to consider alternative means of maintaining a 
position of strength. One option harkened back to the Imperial Navy’s initial actions 
during the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars: surprise. As the United States 
intensified economic pressure on Japan with increased embargoes of raw materials, in 
Tokyo “naval planners declared that only by striking the United States…would Japan 
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have a chance in a war.”271 By 1941, the exhaustion of an arms race with the United 
States led Japan down the road of strategic desperation. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Through a need to ensure autonomous control of economic resources, post-Meiji 
Japan embarked on a program of naval expansion that brought it into direct conflict with 
the dominant industrial and naval power of the mid-twentieth century – the United States. 
Having experienced subservience to Western powers during the Meiji Restoration, Japan 
sought the means to guarantee its independence. The Japanese naval theorist Sato 
Tetsutaro, borrowing directly from Mahan, had cautioned that, “(h)istory proves that 
since time immemorial there has been no nation that became a world power without 
oceanic expansion.”272 With the idea of maritime power as a central component to 
national strength, the growth of a powerful navy became a key component in Japan’s 
expansion.  
The experience of the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars served as defining 
events in Japan’s search for a strategy.  Unfortunately, the lessons of those conflicts 
focused more on budgets and ship building rather than a coherent maritime strategy: 
“Japanese strategists focused primarily on tactics and operations rather than the more 
rarefied dimensions of naval warfare…because…they learned about naval strategy more 
from combat experience than from abstract seapower theory.”273 Instead of budgets and 
hardware that flowed from an articulated strategy, Imperial Japanese Navy leaders 
matched strategy to their desired budgets and hardware. When naval arms limitations 
were deemed detrimental to the needs of Japan’s maritime policy, Tokyo focused on 
expanding its fleet – an expansion that directly challenged the interest of Western powers 
in the Western Pacific and East Asia. Using the United States as a planning model, Japan 
failed to take into account the detrimental effect of antagonizing the United States. As the 
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Imperial Japanese Navy grew, the United States Navy, once well-funded, was more than 
able to expand to handle the challenge of Japan’s fleet.   
Ultimately, “the essential element that led to war was Japan’s terrible economic 
vulnerability and its decision, in the light of the lessons of World War I, to do something 
about it.”274 The navy served as a key factor in Japan’s effort to secure itself from 
economic vulnerability. As “Japanese leaders could not imagine a status between 
dependence and independence and had not yet accepted the possibility of 
interdependence,”275 the concept of naval force working in conjunction with another  
power’s navy was not an idea entertained by Tokyo. As the Imperial Japanese Navy  
grew, the likelihood for conflict with a peer power grew. With an interest in maintaining 
an open China, the United States and its navy assumed the role of Japan’s antagonist. In 
the end, the naval arms race between Japan and the United States was a principal cause 
for the tensions that initiated World War II in the Pacific. 
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IV.  THE RISE OF THE IMPERIAL GERMAN NAVY, 1871-1914 
The way in which nations are able to marshal and expand power is a question of 
great import to historians and policy-makers alike. History is filled with multiple 
instances of a once minor player on the international stage that is able to transform itself 
into a central power. During the nineteenth century, Germany played that role amongst 
the great powers of Europe. The German states, which were a collection of principalities 
and states at the start of the 1800s, unified into the Second Reich and subsequently grew 
to dominate the economic and political concerns of its neighbors by the start of the 
twentieth century. Germany’s growth directly shaped its view of the rightful place of the 
Second Reich; just prior to the start of World War I in 1914, with the largest industrial 
output in Europe, “nationalists…exulted at these manifestations of growth and their 
implications for Germany’s place in the world.”276  
Prior to World War I, there were numerous debates within the Empire regarding 
how Germany could best take its rightful place in the world. Economic might needed to 
be transmitted into German power, and a key means of enacting that ideal was the 
dedicated effort to expand and modernize the Imperial German Navy. One explanation 
for why Germany sought to expand its navy is that in 1894 Kaiser Wilhelm II, the third 
emperor of the Reich, read the naval theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan’s work The Influence 
of Seapower on History and “immediately concluded that Germany’s rise to the status of 
a world power could only occur through creation of a great fleet.”277 Mahan’s work, 
however, likely fit into an existing German ambition, one heavily promoted by the 
Secretary of State of the Imperial Naval Office, Vice Admiral Alfred Tirpitz (later von 
Tirpitz). It was the government’s goal to “realize its dream of ‘a place in the sun’ by 
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revolutionizing the international system (which) required the buildup of a power navy 
which could eventually enforce its claim…”278 
The buildup of the Imperial German Navy would have a significant impact on the 
balance of power in pre-World War I Europe. To understand both the nature of 
Germany’s naval growth and the response of competitive powers, it is necessary to first 
outline the context of the German Unification and the subsequent push for Great Power 
Status. Once the broader background has been framed, the strategy Berlin to attain Great 
Power status, as well as its impact on global affairs, will be outlined.  
A. GERMAN UNIFICATION 
Germany’s rise during the course of the nineteenth century can be described as 
nothing less than swift. The forces that allowed a loose confederation of states to form 
into Europe’s most powerful continental nation-state are central to understanding 
Germany’s later turn to the sea. 
1. Pre-German Unification 
In the first half of the nineteenth century, Germany was a mostly agrarian and 
rural nation with little political unity.279 It was Otto von Bismarck, minister-president 
(prime minister) of Prussia from 1862 forward, who brought union to politically divided 
Germany. Bismarck’s original ambitions as prime minister “were limited: the 
preservation of Prussia and the interest of its ruling class…”280 During the course of three 
wars with Denmark, Austria, and France between 1864 and 1871, Prussia, under the 
leadership of Bismarck, asserted  both political dominance of the German states, as well 
as military prowess second to none. With a confederation of German states agreeing to 
Bismarck’s proposal to establish a Second Reich, the King of Prussia was elevated to the 
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position of emperor, or kaiser, in 1871. Bismarck’s desire to preserve Prussia led to the 
establishment of an empire with Bismarck himself serving as the first chancellor of 
Germany. Internationally, what was most relevant to Germany’s future military 
expansion was the sense amongst other powers that, “(t)hroughout the process of German 
unification, there had been little concern about its impact on the balance of power.”281 
Other states misunderstood the motivating force behind Germany’s unification: power. 
Bismarck had worked to guarantee the power of Prussia and had expanded it over a brief 
period of time. The drive for power, derived from “a greater Prussia whose principal 
purpose was to increase its own power,”282 would be the motivating factor for Germany. 
2. Post-German Unification 
Of particular note, the nature of Germany’s political structure after 1871 was 
unique compared to other great powers in Europe. A compromise of the expanding 
middle class liberalism and the ruling class’ autocratic status, “(t)he political system of 
the German Empire was devised…so as to give maximum protection from parliamentary 
influence to those institutions that had always been the…preserve of the conservative 
elite…”283 Germany’s Reichstag, or parliament, had no real say as to the formulation of 
specific policies. The middle class allowed for a conservative, autocratic system due to 
the combination of perceived benefits of industrialization and a fear of the forces of 
socialism. The ruling forces in Germany were convinced that the German government’s 
strength and ability to resist socialism depended upon cooperation between conservatives 
and “groups that derived financial support from heavy industry and agriculture.”284 
Unlike England, where a growing middle class had demanded expanded political 
authority to match their economic status, the German middle class remained reluctant to 
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demand political influence to match their significant social and economic weight.285 With 
a strong agricultural base dominated by landed nobility (the Junkers), a growing 
industrial capacity, and the benefits of the German Trade Union’s common currency and 
tariff system, Germany’s economy served to bolster a political system that prevented the 
common man from interfering with policy. Ensuring the long-term survivability of such a 
system would be a central domestic concern for Germany’s rulers.  
3. The Role of Nationalism 
Historically, it is important to recognize the force of nationalism in both the pre- 
and post-unification periods of German history. Although nationalism as a defining force 
originally had few belligerent overtones, the impact of the French Revolution of 1789 
changed nationalism’s nature. For many thinkers, “nationalism took on an aggressive, 
bellicose character; nowhere was this more true than in Germany…”286 Combined with 
an economic system that provided for a common German market, German nationalism 
was a force leveraged by Bismarck to help form the Second Reich. One explanation for 
the relatively passive political role of the middle class is that “(s)trong nationalist 
sentiment, focused principally on the Imperial throne as the symbol of the new nation, 
forced a bridge connecting the spheres of culture and state.”287 Focusing on Prussia’s 
triumph over other nations, particularly the French, and on the greatness of the newly 
founded Empire, the German people experienced little to temper the ethnocentric power 
of nationalism. The middle class in Germany “provided the nucleus of nationalist 
agitation without encountering in the political system the sort of parliamentary buffer”288 
that would channel the people’s passions constructively. As time went on, German 
nationalism, viewed within Germany as a constructive force that allowed for the founding 
of a powerful empire, turned from an inwardly directed to an outwardly directed force.  
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The alignment of an outwardly directed nationalism with the desire to expand Germany’s 
economic and political sphere of influence played an important role in the expansion of 
the Imperial German Navy.  
B. GERMANY’S GEO-POLITICAL OUTLOOK, LATE NINETEENTH 
CENTURY 
Following unification, Germany’s economic strength grew at an impressive rate. 
An expanding population and industry were key factors in making Germany the emerging 
powerhouse of Europe. For the leadership in Berlin, success raised several concerns 
regarding relations with the other powers of Europe. 
1. The Drive for Great Power Status 
While not considered a significant threat, the newly unified German Empire 
showed signs of an unrealized ambition. From the period immediately following 
unification until Bismarck’s dismissal as Chancellor by Kaiser Wilhelm II in 1890, 
Germany grew in strength without upsetting its neighbors. Aware that other nations were 
slightly uneasy due to the three conflicts that immediately proceeded unification, 
Bismarck balanced Germany against the ambitions of Russia, France, and England. Once 
Bismarck was dismissed, his successors abandoned Bismarck’s trademark moderation 
with the determination that Germany “serve as the hammer and not the anvil of European 
diplomacy.”289 A review of the German Reich’s economic and political concerns 
regarding its role in international affairs will highlight the domestic and foreign 
influences that drove Germany’s leadership to emphasize “that the German Empire really 
was a world power in its own right and therefore fully entitled to have its say in 
international affairs.”290  
The primary manifestation of this ideology was the transformation of Realpolitik 
into Weltpolitik. First mentioned in 1890, Weltpolitik was not to become the official view 
of the Reich until 1897. Unlike the measured and realistic diplomatic maneuvering of 
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Bismarck, Weltpolitik emphasized a worldly view that stressed the growth of German 
influence beyond the borders of Germany. Interestingly, Weltpolitik served to highlight 
the uncertain nature of the new Germany; this uncertainty demonstrated that “Germany 
was not sure of itself, of its own strength and status or of its limitations and 
weaknesses.”291 In such a situation, it is necessary to understand specific issues that 
highlighted Germany’s need for military modernization. 
a. Economic Concerns of Modernization 
For Germany, the benefits of economic growth were notable in export 
growth and its expanding manufacturing base. Unfortunately, “economic specialization 
within the world economy increased their dependence on overseas trade.”292 German 
industry simply could not survive without imports that arrived from the sea. Like other 
Continental powers, when Germany pursued economic specialization and 
industrialization it became vulnerable to the somewhat tenuous flow of strategic raw 
materials.293 By the late 1890’s, it was apparent to then State Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs Bernhard von Bulow that Germany’s economic vulnerability was a significant 
concern. During a conversation with Kaiser Wilhelm II, he noted that Germany “was 
entrusting an ever-increasing share of its products to the high seas; this wealth…must be 
better protected that hitherto…”294 The question of maritime security was a significant 
concern for German foreign policy.  
Along with import concerns, Berlin was equally anxious regarding its 
potential export markets. In the shadow of a downturn in the domestic economy during 
the 1870’s, German manufacturers needed to find markets in order to sell their goods. As 
the only alternative to a domestic market is a foreign market, the need to expand market 
opportunities for manufacturers directed the attention of Germany’s business community 
outward to foreign lands. A common view in Berlin was that “(t)he domestic market 
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alone…was no longer adequate for German industry: instead, there must be a search for 
alternative markets throughout the world, secured if need be by governmental 
protection.”295  
Specifically, Germany began to look seriously at the need to acquire 
colonial possessions. That conclusion was the end of an extended policy process; during 
the 1880’s, Bismarck had no intention to establish an overseas empire in the image of the 
British Empire296 But the process of protecting and promoting German commerce led 
Bismarck and others to realize that the increasing amount of government protection and 
involvement of overseas trade could best be served by the acquisition of overseas 
possessions. Envisioning that the “overseas possessions…would be run by companies 
themselves, under a government charter...All that the German government was required 
to do was to grant Reichsschutz (Reich protection)…”297 Economic concerns associated 
with modernization had turned the eye of Berlin outwards in search of lands of 
opportunity. To many in the commercial sector, it was apparent that without its own 
empire, Germany’s industry would remain dependent on other great powers to guarantee 
access and security of commerce across the globe. 298 
b. Political Concerns of Modernization 
Along with the benefits of industrialization, the political structure of the 
German Empire underwent tremendous strain. Bismarck’s original political organization 
was intended to maintain the political power of the Junkers, encourage middle-class 
economic expansion via industrialization, and marginalize any challenge to the traditional 
Prussian mechanisms of government. Social growth after 1871 challenged that structure 
as “(t)he growth of an industrial proletariat whose leaders saw an opportunity of gaining a 
voice in the Reichstag via the universal suffrage also contributed to the slow decline of 
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the politics of the notables…”299 The growing and increasingly urbanized population 
provided voters more aligned with liberal and socialist movements, not the agrarian’s 
conservative parties. In the end, the group for whom the Empire was intended to maintain 
power, the nobles, faced a challenge to their authority from the growing number of 
workers. By the 1890s, with the landed class aligned towards agrarian interests and 
fearing loss of power, and rising social forces aligned towards industrial concerns 
regarding urbanization and the plight of German workers, “an atmosphere of protracted 
crisis prevailed…jealousy and mistrust between the agrarian and industrial sectors of 
Germany’s ruling class on the one hand, fear of social revolt from below and ‘coup 
d’état’ from above…”300 Internally, Germany was unbalanced and in turmoil. 
While Bismarck was still Reich chancellor, efforts to assure other powers 
as to the benign nature of Germany were constant and delicately balanced. Bismarck had 
a well-delineated mission, and “(c)entral to his goal was the need to convince the other 
powers that Germany was what he repeatedly asserted: a ‘saturated’ power that need to 
turn inward to consolidate in peace…”301 External political relations focused heavily on 
not antagonizing other Great Powers. As an extension of that idea, Bismarck wanted to 
ensure that no alliance was created that would marginalize Germany. A real threat of 
isolation developed after 1871 as Germany’s rapid economic expansion simultaneously 
threatened several other great powers.302 As the nineteenth century progressed, 
Germany’s overt attempt to demonstrate to other powers a lack of territorial ambition was 
lost with the resignation of Bismarck in 1890. Whereas Bismarck had limited territorial 
ambitions out of a desire to not provoke other states, a more assertive foreign policy 
under Wilhelm II followed a historical pattern whereby rising powers call for change in 
an international order that politically and economically favors older and more established 
powers.303  
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With a powerful economy and thriving population, Germany faced the late 
nineteenth century with growing internal unrest and international tensions in response to 
German calls for a greater place in international affairs. Containing these forces would 
become a major focus of German politics as the twentieth century neared. Of the many 
avenues that provided possible relief from Germany’s political concerns, the military and, 
in particular, naval modernization provided a clear possibility for alleviating Berlin’s 
trepidations.  
2. Military Modernization 
The Imperial German Navy of the Reich’s early decades was a secondary service. 
Germany, and Prussia before it, had been continental powers. Military matters had been 
solved almost exclusively with land forces. In many ways, the Navy acted merely as a 
coastal defense force; by the early-1880s, only seven frigates and four corvettes formed 
Germany’s first cohesive surface action group.304 With Bismarck remarking that he 
desired “Germany to remain ‘a sea power of the second rank’…,”305  the prospects of the 
Navy to be used as a force to ensure political and economic strength were dire. By any 
measure, it was apparent that Germany’s naval growth had lagged behind growth in all 
other industrial fields.306 Yet, the need for economic security demanded that the German 
government provide the means for the expansion of commerce and safe passage of 
imported goods.  
Ultimately, by the 1890s it was apparent that Germany needed a service that could 
provide both economic security and diplomatic muscle. The need to promote German 
interests via naval strength was a logical choice. For a continental power, “one of the 
most far-reaching decisions was to seek additional military power not on land – Prussia  
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and Germany’s traditional domain – but at sea.”307 How Germany would update its fleet 
and ensure its interests, both domestically and globally, would shape the geopolitics of 
Europe for decades to come. 
C. MATCHING ENDS AND MEANS: CHOOSING A STRATEGY 
As Germany faced its future in the late nineteenth century, it was apparent that a 
policy was needed that would elevate the status of the Imperial German Navy. In 
choosing a strategy, it was important for Germany’s leaders, most notably Kaiser 
Wilhelm II and Admiral von Tirpitz – at a minimum – implicitly to recall that “maritime 
strategy is the direction of all aspects of national power that relate to a nation’s interests 
at sea…maritime strategy is not purely a naval preserve.”308 Germany had external 
problems for which the navy appeared to be an ideal solution, but internal issues were 
also of concern. Berlin had to take into account its own condition and implement a policy 
via a strategy that would be suitable for the needs of the nation.  
1. Models of Maritime Strategy 
Prior to 1890, the desire for a navy of significant weight was uneven. As a 
continental power, the maritime strength of other nations was not viewed as significant a 
threat to a state whose security rested on its land forces. As the central policy-maker for 
the Reich, Chancellor Bismarck had not viewed British naval power as a significant 
threat to Germany’s overseas interests. As late as 1889, Bismarck had extolled the British 
fleet as “the greatest factor for peace in Europe.”309 The Imperial German Navy was 
consigned to a secondary status to that of the army, “relegated in the scheme of national 
defense to the role of a sort of…coastal defense corps.”310 To adapt and expand its navy  
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to a greater role, Germany’s leadership had several possible avenues of advance. A 
review of the dominant naval strategies of the time demonstrates the various strengths 
and weaknesses of the options at hand.  
a. Jeune Ecole (the “Young School”) 
Perhaps the simplest strategy Germany might have adopted was that of the 
Jeune Ecole, or “Young School.” Faced with the continued dominance of the Royal 
Navy, French theorists, led by Admiral Theopile Aube, decided to no longer try to beat 
the British at their own game. Instead, the Jeune Ecole assumed that there was a way for 
a weaker power to defeat a stronger power. By the 1870’s, the means to this end appeared 
to be “that torpedo-boats were the main weapon with which secondary naval powers 
could hope to neutralize the British battleship superiority.”311 Later, this theory was 
coupled with a traditional feature of naval warfare – commerce raiding. Commerce 
raiding did not require sizable fleets of man-of-wars, but instead fast cruisers that could 
prey on enemy shipping.  
Admiral Tirpitz, the central figure in Germany’s naval expansion, was an 
expert in torpedo boat operations based on his multiple postings to torpedo craft 
commands. It might have seemed apparent that Tirpitz would rely upon his experience in 
designing Germany’s future fleet. But the Jeune Ecole possessed significant weaknesses 
that precluded it as an ideal choice. Firstly, torpedo craft at the time were technologically 
limited to near-shore operations; the likelihood of significantly interfering with an 
enemy’s operations far at sea was remote. Secondly, unrestricted commerce raiding of an 
enemy had the potential to unwittingly antagonize other nations that saw such activity as 
unlawful. Count Caprivi, chancellor following Bismarck’s resignation, held that 
“commerce raiding by cruisers to be far less effective in the age of steamships…as 
(m)erchant ships were faster than cruisers…”312 Finally, Jeune Ecole did not address the 
possibility that an enemy force may in fact choose to attack friendly commerce. Once 
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away from the protection of torpedo boats near the coast, friendly commerce was too 
vulnerable to the whims of great naval powers. Although the “Young School” dominated 
the naval theory of continental powers during the 1870s and 1880s, it did not suit the 
purposes of a nation desiring to expand its influence globally. For Germany, an 
alternative to the Jeune Ecole was needed. 
b. Mahan 
At the same time that Wilhelm II ascended to the position of the Kaiser in 
1890, Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote his first and most famous work, The Influence of 
Seapower Upon History 1660-1783. In terms of theory, Mahan revolutionized formal 
work in naval theory by forming “an ideology grounded in the notion that naval power 
was the most decisive factor in the political and economic rise and fall of nations.”313 
Recognizing the role of commerce as vital to a nation’s well being, Mahan identified the 
purpose of a navy: “The necessity of a navy…springs, therefore, from the existence of a 
peaceful shipping, and disappears with it…”314 Commerce required protection from 
commerce raiders, and Mahan saw the means to provide protection in a fleet that could 
guarantee freedom of movement over the maritime domain via command of the seas. As 
opposing forces would hold similar views, it was important to recognize that a fleet 
designed to protect trade would need to eliminate the threat of an opposing fleet. In 
Mahan’s words, “in war the proper main objective of the navy is the enemy’s navy.”315 
For Germany, the prospect of a naval policy oriented around a great fleet was 
more than attractive. Within Germany, “nationalists were searching for arguments in 
favor of an expansionist foreign policy. Mahan was one among several influential pundits 
who met that need.”316 There is little doubt that Mahan’s theories served to bolster a 
Germany looking outward to far-off horizons that only a navy could reach. Overall, 
however, his reception in Germany does not indicate to a satisfactory degree whether 
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Mahan’s thought was a motivating factor for German naval expansion, or merely a useful 
explanatory ideology to go along with what Germany already needed. To best understand 
the role of Mahan, it is important to look to the source of Germany’s naval policy in the 
1890’s, Admiral von Tirpitz.   
c. Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz and Risk Theory   
Following command of the Asian cruiser squadron at Germany’s recently 
acquired Qingdao naval base in China, Tirpitz was selected to serve as the secretary of 
state for the Imperial Naval Office in 1897. At that time, Germany’s late start to imperial 
status had a significant impact on Germany’s worldview. The business class was acutely 
aware that “without an empire of its own, German industry would always be dependent 
on other great powers.”317 Tirpitz was well aware that Germany’s economy was at risk as 
long as other powers could interfere with commerce, and that “the building of a navy was 
seen as a prerequisite to a future German world empire.”318 But simply having a navy 
was not sufficient. If Germany wanted to impose its will on the international community, 
it must be able to challenge the preeminence of the international community’s strongest 
fleet, the Royal Navy. Well after the implementation of the naval expansion, Sir Julian 
Corbett explicitly stated what Tirpitz had acted upon implicitly: “…command may exist 
in various states or degrees…mere local command, except in very favorable geographical 
conditions, should scarcely ever be regarded as more than temporary.”319 Tirpitz wanted 
a fleet that could aid the empire’s expansion, but the British were the best. What was 
needed was not a fleet that could necessarily defeat the British, but one that could 
threaten the British and make British command a temporary condition. In this context, 
Tirpitz designed his “risk theory.”  
Risk theory implied that Germany would have to build a navy powerful 
enough to threaten an opponent’s well-being, not necessarily its survival. A clear 
exposition of the theory holds the following: 
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The essence of that theory was that as the German Navy could not be 
made strong enough for a reasonable chance of victory…it should be 
made so strong that its destruction would cost even the strongest sea 
power such heavy losses, endangering its supremacy vis-à-vis third navies, 
that the mere thought of that risk would act as a deterrent against an 
attack.320 
For Germany to leverage its force against the British, an approximate ratio 
of two ships to every three British vessels was needed. Only with a force of that ratio 
could Germany utilize its fleet in a Corbett-like strategic defensive, one that highlighted 
the danger of attacking Germany. In this context, it is apparent that Tirpitz “…needed no 
Mahan to crystallize his ideas regarding German naval policy.”321 The needs of Germany 
presented Tirpitz with enough justification for the expansion of the Imperial Germany 
Navy. 
2. Germany’s Choice 
Based on the realities of the Reich’s economic and political situation, Germany’s 
turn towards a naval strategy that emphasized rapid growth of the battle fleet was a 
logical conclusion for Berlin. Although some might argue that Mahan’s theory of 
“command of the sea” presented the motivating dogma for Tirpitz and the Kaiser, 
Mahan’s work acted more as a useful tool to help execute a job already planned. For 
Germany in particular, The Influence of Seapower Upon History served a wonderfully 
ideological role:  
…the book at once reflected and ratified the ruthlessly competitive spirit 
that had grown up with the industrial era, turning that spirit into 
an…immutable set of historical laws revolving around a single theme: 
national expansion or national death.322 
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Germany was already convinced of its need to grow. At most, Mahan’s work may 
have served to buttress Berlin’s pre-existing inclination towards naval expansion.323 
Ultimately, however, the German leadership chose naval expansion and the risk theory 
for specific foreign and domestic reasons.  
In foreign policy, Tirpitz sought implementation of a ship-building program that 
could meet the requirements of the risk theory in order to “use the potentialities of a new 
instrument of force, the Navy, to achieve diplomatic re-alignment.”324 Germany needed 
foreign markets and colonies, and a powerful fleet could be used to convince other 
nations to allow Germany, a late-comer to the imperial competition, a more suitable piece 
of world wealth. For many German citizens, a powerful navy served to make up for 
Bismarck’s failure in the 1870s and 1880s to acquire large overseas colonies.325 
Domestically, the need to quell social forces that might desire liberalization of the 
political structure of the empire was partially satisfied by the prospects of the economic 
benefits of a renewed naval construction program. To that end, “the Navy was to act as a 
focus for divergent social forces which the government hoped to bribe into a conservative 
Sammlung (collection or coalition) against the ‘Revolution’.”326 Construction of the fleet, 
needed to achieve Germany’s Weltpolitik, would provide an incentive for industrialists, 
the nobility, and the political organizations of the Reich to maintain the status quo and to 
marginalize the calls from liberals and socialists to reform Germany’s government. 
Tirpitz noted that maritime interests needed to be expanded quickly as “…in no small 
degree also because there lies in this new great national task, and the economic gain 
which is bound up with it, a strong palliative against educated and semi-educated Social-
democrats.”327 
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In the end, the foreign and domestic economic and political concerns of the 
German Empire forced a policy shift that was spearheaded by a new and expansive naval 
strategy. Viewed as a means of promoting external ambitions while also exerting control 
over subversive internal forces, the naval policy chosen by Tirpitz and the Kaiser served 
one overriding purpose: “the stabilisation of the Prusso-German political system.”328 
With that end in mind, Germany embarked upon a naval construction program initiated 
by a series of specific laws enacted at the turn of the century. The way in which that 
policy was enacted, and its effects upon Germany and Germany’s peers, will highlight 
the specific political and economic impacts of an expansive naval policy.  
D. IMPACT OF AN EXPANDING MARITIME STRATEGY 
Germany’s decision to expand its navy in order to support foreign and domestic 
policy goals had an impact that helped shape the pre-World War I landscape of European 
politics. With the passage of the German Naval Bills of 1898 and 1900, Berlin’s intent 
was clear. In London, it was apparent that “the doctrines of coast defense and commerce 
raiding yielded to the regal, first-rank desideratum of ‘Command of the Sea.’”329 
Germany intended to take on the status of a world-class power. In both domestic and 
foreign relations, the expansive naval strategy of the Second Reich would have far-
reaching consequences.    
1. The German Navy Laws of 1898 and 1900 
Shortly after his posting as Secretary of State for the Imperial Navy Office, 
Admiral Tirpitz collaborated with the Kaiser and Chancellor Bulow to pass the first 
Germany Navy Law of 1898. Seen as the fulfillment of Germany’s desire to mass a fleet 
capable of supporting its interests, the 1898 bill outlined a building program of 19 
battleships and several dozen cruisers of various types. The 1900 bill raised the number 
of battleships to 38. Both bills had provisions that mandated replacement of capital ships 
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over a 25-year cycle. Based on an assumed Royal Navy of 90 capital ships, Tirpitz’s goal 
of three capital ships a year over a 20-year period would give the Germany Navy until 
1918 to reach the acceptable level of force his “risk theory” demanded. Both bills also 
obligated the Reichstag to fund naval expansion. Finally, it was with the 1900 bill that 
Germany’s policy of Weltpolitik was explicitly stated. With these laws, Tirpitz had 
formalized into state policy the strategy considered necessary to attain the Reich’s long-
range goal of attaining the rightful place of a Great Power. 
2. Internal Effects 
a. Public Opinion and Morale 
Among the internal consequences of Germany’s new policy, the impact to 
domestic politics was significant. In order to gain concurrence in the Reichstag for 
passage of the 1898 bill, the landed agricultural conservatives had demanded the return of 
agricultural tariffs to pre-Chancellor Caprivi levels (1890-1894). Those tariffs caused 
widespread dissatisfaction due to increased food costs that impacted lower classes. 
Additionally, by 1901, a trade slump undermined the Imperial Navy Office’s contention 
that rising trade costs would be offset by increased trade receipts. The lower classes, 
susceptible to socialist influence, were a ready audience when August Bebel, a founder of 
the Socialist Democratic Party, claimed that the fleet policy enacted by the German Navy 
Laws was a gross failure that could only lead to nationwide financial catastrophe.330 
Germany’s ruling class found that costs of the fleet expansion, coupled with the rising 
costs due to renewed tariffs, were inflaming the very social tension that the naval laws 
had intended to quell. 
From the conservative coalitions and propaganda groups, Chancellor 
Bulow and Admiral Tirpitz experienced a different problem. Relying upon the German 
people’s nationalism to support Weltpolitik aroused passions that could not always be 
controlled. During the Boer War of 1898, Anglophobia struck, and Bulow found that 
“(t)he nationalist sentiments…(he) had sought to exploit as the basis for his new 
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integrative ‘Weltpolitik’ soon took on an uncontrollable momentum of their own.”331 
Negative press reports and editorials caused consternation within the foreign policy arm 
of the government; in a country as autocratic as Germany, how could the Reich explain to 
the British that anti-British sentiments were not promoted? In the long run, the 
government found itself expending time and energy tempering the passions of the very 
portions of society it relied upon for full support. 
Finally, it is important to note the effect of the sustained expansion on the 
Navy itself. With conscripts reporting annually for training and funds low due to 
construction requirements, by 1907 the officer corps was demoralized. It appeared that 
parity with England would never occur. Worse, tensions with England that indicated the 
possibility of war only made things worse as “front-line commands found it impossible to 
live with the fact that they would be nothing but cannon fodder…”332 The Imperial 
German Navy’s sense of inferiority remained a detrimental factor to military readiness up 
to the start of World War I. 
b. Economics 
Perhaps the most important internal factor regarding the effects of the 
naval bills had to do with the funding of the fleet. Between 1900 and 1912, total 
expenditures for naval construction rose from 7.9 million pounds sterling to 23.1 million 
pounds sterling.333 During that entire period, England’s expenditures never fell below 
that of Germany’s; that situation placed political pressure on the Imperial Naval Office to 
continually seek higher levels of funding. Although cost guarantees were written into the 
1898 and 1900 bills, cost overruns became a matter of grave concern due to the impact 
they had on the overall treasury. By 1905, the funding for naval construction proved such 
a drain on the Reich’s treasury that the Reichstag had to contemplate new means of 
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generating tax revenue.334 The issue of new tax revenue was driven by the fact that 
Germany had no national tax income base.  
Worse still, German ship construction proved financially inefficient 
compared to England. Whereas the British became more efficient at producing capital 
ships and decreased the cost of subsequent dreadnought constructions, the Germans 
suffered annual cost increases. When the cost of battleship construction is compared, by 
1909 Germany was spending 20 percent more for Dreadnoughts than Great Britain.335 
Near the end of his time as chancellor in 1909, Bernhard von Bulow concluded that a 
slowdown in the overall naval program was essential for both domestic and foreign 
reason. In Bulow’s opinion, “the financial burden of naval armaments had become 
intolerable.”336 Unfortunately, construction and operational costs continued at varying 
rates up until the start of World War I in 1914. One estimate holds that, by 1914, “naval 
building added no less than 1,040,700,000 GM (German Marks) to the national debt.”337 
That debt prevented investment into other areas important to the domestic and external 
well-being of the Reich. With the army and social services already demanding a high 
level of national wealth, the naval construction program proved to be an insupportable 
burden. 
3. External Effects 
a. Alliances and Great Power Politics 
Internationally, Germany’s growing naval strength combined with the 
overtly stated Weltpolitik policy in an unsettling manner. Germany’s naval growth 
spurred a worldwide expansion of naval power. As other nations, including France and 
Russia, expended wealth in an attempt to maintain some degree of parity in the naval 
arms race, it became apparent that even the largest navy in the world, the Royal Navy, 
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could no longer be in all places at all times. In 1902, England signed the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance with the intention of both leveraging the Japanese fleet to help maintain freedom 
of trade in East Asia, as well as to prevent any combination of opposing fleets against 
British interests in the region. By receiving the guarantee of an ally to provide force when 
needed in Asia, Great Britain made certain that it would not have to weaken its home or 
Mediterranean fleets to ensure British interests in the Pacific.338 Instead, fleet assets were 
needed to counter the growing strength of navies near the British Isles. Although other 
nations were building larger navies as well, England found Germany’s expansion 
particularly troublesome as Berlin’s post-Bismarck foreign policy had taken on a 
belligerent character. Although not originally anti-British, Weltpolitik “soon became so 
because of the basic political and geographical situation – Britain controlled Germany’s 
routes to the outside world…”339 Expressing Germany’s desire for greater power, the 
naval policy of Germany helped to press England to realign its foreign policy in Asia in 
order to better manage the growing threat from across the North Sea.  
Germany’s increased militarism motivated other nations to limit its 
acquisition of highly desired imperial gains. Just prior to World War I, England and the 
United States agreed to allow each other oversight of Middle East and Latin American oil 
reserves, respectively. By doing so, “the Germans were effectively denied control over 
oil imports at a time when only 10 percent of Germany’s growing oil requirements was 
supplied by internal production.”340 Earlier, England supported France in both 1905 and 
1911 in order to prevent German colonial expansion into Morocco and North Africa. 
Although Germany failed in its efforts, the growing might of the Reich convinced 
England of the soundness of an accord with France. In early 1907, Sir Eyre Crowe, a 
British Foreign Office analyst, assessed that, in spite of significant differences, an 
alliance with France was desirable because of the growing threat from Germany. 
Specifically, what made the Germans appear such a threat was Berlin’s “lack of any 
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discernable rationale behind its ceaseless global challenges…”341 The naval policy of 
Tirpitz and Wilhelm II was the foremost expression of Germany’s challenge to the 
existing world order. With the sustainment of the 1904 entente between France and 
England, the 1894 Franco-Russian alliance, and the 1907 agreement between Russia and 
England regarding the division of labor in Asia, Germany found that it was effectively 
encircled by what is now known as the Triple Entente.  
Between 1900 and the start of World War I, Germany found itself isolated 
from the other Great Powers of Europe due to its global strategy that was based on the 
foundation of Weltpolitik and an expansive naval program. While Berlin may have 
interpreted the Triple Entente as being directed at the Triple Alliance of Germany, Italy, 
and Austria-Hungary, the Triple Entente was instead a system of bilateral alliances 
utilized to limit Germany’s expressed desire to acquire colonial possessions and spheres 
of influence.342 The Triple Entente was the structural result of the Great Powers 
responding to the German Weltpolitik, which had been formally expressed in the 1900 
Navy Law.  
b. The Royal Navy 
Aside from the broader consideration of alliances, the response of the 
Royal Navy to expansion of the Imperial Germany Navy was a significant factor in the 
escalation of tensions prior to World War I. That response had two distinct and important 
characteristics: qualitative and quantitative. 
In 1906, the British introduced a new kind of warship to its fleet. The 
HMS Dreadnought represented a technological leap in naval warfare. Spurred on by Sir 
John Fisher, Britain’s First Sea Lord, the 17,900 ton Dreadnought carried ten 12-inch 
guns and was the first warship driven by steam turbines. Commissioned into service a 
mere 14 months after she was laid down, Dreadnought also represented the strength of 
England’s ship building industry. Her firepower and speed far outclassed the German 
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vessels planned for in the German Navy Laws of 1898 and 1900. The Dreadnought 
presented Admiral Tirpitz with a significant issue: “Fisher’s Dreadnought…‘leap’, 
coupled with other reforms…effectively blunted the German naval challenge of 1900.”343 
Tirpitz realized that, in order to provide a fleet of vessels that could threaten England’s 
maritime dominance, Germany had to upgrade the quality of vessels it was producing. 
Tirpitz and his staff outlined a plan to increase the tonnage of Germany’s battle-cruisers 
and dreadnoughts. By the end of 1906, Tirpitz was faced with an unenviable prospect: 
“hav(ing) to ask Parliament for an additional allocation to cover the increased costs of the 
qualitative arms race.”344 The desired increased costs were estimated to require an 
increase in taxation of 130 million marks.345 With the prospect of German warships that 
could challenge Royal Navy vessels, England responded by quickly building more 
advanced and expensive ships of their own. The response of Tirpitz to the qualitative 
challenge of the Sir John Fisher was “to pick up the gauntlet that he felt Fisher had 
thrown…”346 Doing so committed Germany to a costly and resource intensive naval arms 
race, a race in which England had a significant qualitative head start. In direct response to 
the Royal Navy’s new ships, Tirpitz pushed for the 1906 Navy Bill that authorized the 
construction of six additional ships with tonnage up to 18,000 tons, thereby guaranteeing 
that “…the anti-British ambitions of the Imperial Navy would be clear to everyone.”347 
In terms of quantity, Germany hoped to produce enough overall warships 
to make Tirpitz’s “risk theory” a reality. In response to the perceived threat of growing 
German naval strength, Sir John Fisher took a key operational step and simply 
redistributed the Royal Navy’s existing fleet presence. With the Japanese working in 
concert to maintain trade in and around China, Britain’s battleship fleet was increased 
near home waters. Between 1904 and 1905, the number of battleships around the English 
Channel and Atlantic region increased from 16 to 25. At the same time, the 
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Mediterranean presence was reduced, while the battleship presence near China was 
ended.348 Quantitatively, British policy favored more ships near home in order to counter 
Germany’s growing threat. Additionally, British naval yards far out-produced German 
naval yards:  
…between 1897 and 1904, England laid down 27 battleships and 35 large 
armored heavy cruisers, a total of 62 ships, or an average of 7.75 ships a 
year. In the same period Germany built 16 battleships and 5 armored 
cruisers, a total of 21 heavy ships, or an average of 2.62 ships per year, 
only about one-third of the British total.349 
Germany attempted to surpass England in ship production, but that aim 
proved to be a fantasy. Although Tirpitz had called for an increase of major ship 
production of four ships per year, by 1912, the German fleet of 61 major ships was far 
behind the Royal Navy’s size. Recognizing that they could not spend their way into an 
adequate fleet, German support for tax increases to support naval construction faltered in 
1909. By 1912, only two ships per year were scheduled to be produced, which was far 
below the numbers needed to fulfill Tirpitz’s “risk theory.” In the end, the British 
responded to the increased German naval production by simply out-producing them.   
England responded to the threat of German naval expansion by 
demonstrating that England could provide the Royal Navy with better warships than 
Germany could provide the Imperial German Navy. That quality was combined with the 
higher production level of British shipyards. In the end, Germany simply could not 
construct a fleet to challenge the dominance of the Royal Navy.  
E. CONCLUSION 
The ambition of Imperial Germany both to provide for domestic tranquility and to 
attain Great Power status led to the policy of naval expansion as a means of unifying the 
country and providing Germany a means to attain its “place in the sun.” Foreign markets 
and resources were seen as necessary to ensuring the economic well-being and diplomatic 
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prestige of the Reich. Germany wanted to show the world it was a first rate power that 
could promote and defend its own interests. As “any colonial acquisition was dependent 
on the tacit or explicit approval of the British…(t)he building if a navy was seen to be a 
prerequisite to a future German world empire.”350 Under the eyes of Admiral von Tirpitz 
and Kaiser Wilhelm II, the German Navy Laws of 1898 and 1900 provided specific 
means to attain that navy. Unfortunately for the Imperial German Navy, “(i)t was never 
the biggest fleet in the world; Britain would not permit it.”351  
Had German policy makers reflected on the strategic interests of the Empire, they 
may have realized that challenging the dominant maritime force in the world was simply 
too much to ask of the German people and economy. Ultimately seeking economic 
growth that would ensure prosperity at home, Tirpitz and the Kaiser failed to see that the 
Royal Navy would have better served as partners rather than competitors to ensuring the 
flow of trade. For Germany, “(t)he major stumbling block came from the fact that navies 
are almost always thought of in national terms.”352 With a desire to guarantee the pride of 
Germany along with the economic strength of Germany, Berlin chose a policy that, while 
appearing to answer the domestic, external, and nationalistic issues of the Empire, 
ultimately drove a wedge between Germany and her Great Power neighbors, and helped 
create the conditions that started World War I.  
The reasons for embarking on the naval expansion may have seemed logical at the 
time. However, in the end, that logic formulated policy that proved disastrous for the 
well-being of Germany. The fleet that sought to go beyond the task of simply protecting 
the Reich’s commerce, the fleet that sought to challenge the hegemonic maritime power 
of the day, was the fleet that Germany could not afford. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
A. PAST AS PROLOGUE 
Both Imperial Japan and Imperial Germany were growing powers with maritime 
ambitions that caused an increase in regional security tensions. The security tensions 
ultimately led to war. To fully understand the relevance of the experiences of Imperial 
Japan and Imperial Germany, it is important to analyze broad themes that occur when 
maritime ambitions challenge dominant powers. 
1. Themes from History – The Dangers of Growth 
a. Signaling 
The first theme outlined by the historical case studies addresses signaling. 
For Japan, a powerful navy was intended to support the ambitions of Tokyo’s ever-
expanding economic sphere of control. From Washington’s perspective, the fleet ratios 
agreed to at both the Washington and London Naval Conferences provided for a fleet size 
adequate for Japan’s needs. To the United States and United Kingdom, why Tokyo 
demanded a fleet as powerful as the USN and Royal Navy when Japan did not have the 
geopolitical requirements for such a fleet was in part a mystery. When Tokyo responded 
to Washington’s funding of a fleet that simply met previous treaty agreements with the 
“Second Supplemental building program,” the United States felt it had no option but to 
respond to Japan’s threat with its own increased building program. By walking out of the 
Second London Naval Conference and refusing to engage in further international arms 
limitations regimes, Tokyo confirmed that it desired a navy as powerful as it could afford. 
President Roosevelt found it easier to justify a larger USN when Japan acted without 
fully explaining its naval growth, particularly against a background of what appeared to 
be unrestrained expansion in China.353 The failure of Tokyo to signal why it wanted a 
larger fleet contributed to the unsettled response of Washington and the naval arms race 
between Japan and the United States.  
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For Germany, both the commission and omission of poor signals served to 
upset Great Britain. With the 1898 and 1900 German Navy Laws, London assessed that 
Berlin was attempting to challenge the Royal Navy’s supremacy on the high seas. 
Berlin’s claim to simply want its “place in the sun,” an explanation for naval growth that 
centered on the need to protect imperial ambitions, was unsatisfactory to the Royal Navy. 
With the passage of the 1906 German Navy Law, a law that directly responded to the 
Royal Navy’s own increased funding and growth, London was certain that Germany’s 
naval growth was intended as a challenge.354 Unclear early signaling had unsettled the 
British. The 1906 bill passed by Berlin seemed to confirm the danger that London 
perceived. With little recourse but to assume that Germany wanted to threaten Britain on 
the high seas, London enacted larger and larger building programs to ensure the Royal 
Navy’s relative position of superiority over the Imperial German Navy. London had little 
diplomatic recourse to Germany’s efforts without Germany’s full disclosure; therefore, a 
military response to Germany’s military actions was the necessary step. 
b. Economic Self-Interest 
With both Germany and Japan, the perceived need to guarantee economic 
interests against foreign interference played a significant part in the drive to seek naval 
strength. Germany’s assessment that imported resources were strategically vulnerable and 
that overseas markets in the form of colonies needed to be secured directly informed 
Berlin’s assessment that a powerful navy had to be formed to protect Germany’s 
interests.355 Economic insecurity directly informed Berlin’s decision to embark on naval 
expansion.  
For Japan, the perception within Tokyo was even starker: Japan needed 
economic autarky.356 Unable to conceive of engaging in future conflict without first 
securing economic independence from the interference of others, Japan embarked upon 
attempts to impose political control over Manchuria, China, and the greater East Asian 
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community.357 By 1941, unable to guarantee its economic independence after ten years 
of expansion, Japan was vulnerable to the resource embargoes imposed by the United 
States. The tensions that led to the embargoes, embargoes brought about because of 
Japan’s continued advance towards political control of East Asian nations, soon led to 
Pearl Harbor and World War II.  
In both cases, attempts to secure economic independence were key factors 
that pushed each country to seek a more powerful fleet. As economic strength is a key 
sign of a nation’s greatness, the attempts to secure economic independence directly fed 
another common theme of rising maritime powers – the drive for prestige. 
c. The Ideology of Prestige  
Both Japan and Germany used national greatness as a reason for 
developing modern battle fleets. In Japan’s case, the forced opening of its shores by 
foreigners who arrived from the sea served as a key motivating factor in ensuring that 
Japan was a dominant regional naval force. The ratios agreed to under the Washington 
Naval Treaty system were eventually interpreted by Tokyo as indications of the West’s 
continued lack of respect for Japan.358 National pride demanded that Japan be treated on 
equal terms with any Western power; if that could not be agreed upon, military leaders in 
Tokyo made certain that Japan would not interact in international diplomatic and arms 
control regimes. Another powerful conclusion that led to naval growth was the 
assumption that a powerful navy was needed to guarantee the safety of the Greater East 
Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, in many ways an ideological construction in which 
economic anxiety and imperialist arrogance were combined into a single neat package.  
Germany’s own national pride was directly related to the need to ensure 
both economic growth and social stability. The imperial turn to Weltpolitik, or “world 
policy,” served to direct the competing political energies of the newly unified Germany 
outward toward a larger world, and away from an increasingly obsolescent authoritarian 
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regime. The conclusion that external sources could serve to both feed Germany’s 
resource requirements while serving as markets for excess industrial goods underlay 
Berlin’s imperial ambitions. Viewing Germany’s place amongst the Great Powers of 
Europe as hindered by a lack of colonies, the German “place in the Sun” ideology, a drive 
for a worldwide maritime empire, acted as a powerful motivating force in the passage of 
the German Navy Laws.359 Defined by its economic needs, Germany’s desire for 
international prestige, a prestige that could be demonstrated with a robust economy and 
powerful navy, was a key factor in sparking the Anglo-German naval race. 
d. Goliath Defeats David: The Futility of the Underdog in a Naval 
Arms Race 
Perhaps the most important theme in both case studies is the futility of a 
nation-state with a smaller economic and industrial base attempting to match the naval 
growth of a dominant power. Both Japan and Germany assessed that they would be able 
to produce enough naval strength if not to defeat outright, then at least to deter, powers 
which they knew to be stronger on the high seas. As previously outlined, the expectations 
of Japan and Germany were based on static assessments of their respective peer’s 
industrial capacity. When those peers, the United States and United Kingdom, 
respectively, responded to the perceived growing naval threat, Japan and Germany were 
committed to expensive arms races that neither nation could afford. Navies are capital-
intensive institutions, and they are also wasting assets. Both their operating and their 
replacement costs must be included in any estimate of their long-term strategic value. The 
financial calculus of naval power is extremely complex, and for that reason, if for no 
other, it is better to err on the conservative side. The relative ease with which Great 
Britain and the United States were able to match and exceed the naval expansions of their 
rivals caught both Germany and Japan by surprise, and is a clear reflection of the 
strategic misconceptions, not to say illusions, that underlay their respective building 
programs. 
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2. Mapping the Past to the Present – China and Themes from History 
As history never exactly repeats itself, it is important to understand the 
similarities and differences of modern China compared to the case studies of Imperial 
Japan and Imperial Germany.  
a. Similarities 
A review of modern China’s naval expansion demonstrates several themes 
in common with the rise of both Japan and Germany. Signaling, economic self-interest, 
and the ideology of prestige are central factors that indicate China’s rise will increase 
regional tensions. 
The PLA budget is an excellent example of poor signaling. Decided upon 
in secret, it omits key items, which allows China to present an understated image of 
China’s defense growth. The secrecy of the budget may in part be due to China’s 
traditional affinity for deception, but it also reflects its distrust of American motives in 
Asia. Beijing often assesses Washington’s actions in the region as hostile to China’s 
strategic concerns.360 Additionally, pronouncements from Beijing in recent years have 
highlighted China’s assessment that the risk of global war has been reduced, while the 
danger from “hegemonism and unilateralism,” euphemisms for the policies of the United 
States, are on the rise.361 Beijing’s reluctance to more fully disclose policies, budgets, 
and objectives obscure the motives behind the growth of the PLAN, particularly its 
submarine force, which must accordingly be inferred from the identifiable facts at hand, 
and the explicit pronouncements of the government. Under the circumstances the USN 
has been inclined to assume that it is facing a severe long-range threat from China, 
anxieties that are the more credible because the Chinese persistently seem to forgo 
obvious means of allaying them. 
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Beijing’s economic expansion has prompted it to consider how to secure 
access to overseas resources; much like Germany and Japan, Chinese scholars have 
argued for a powerful navy in these terms.362 Fearing that the United States might 
threaten its economy by attacking its energy sources has led Chinese companies to 
interact with governments that the international community shuns.363 Iran, Sudan, and 
Angola are three countries China now assists, to the consternation of the United States 
and European Union. These commercial efforts provide part of the context within which 
the world must inevitably view its naval modernization efforts, which apparently aim to 
extend China’s military reach into the South China Sea and, eventually, beyond.  
Finally, the humiliation felt by Japan at the hands of Western Powers was 
first felt by China.  China’s capitulation during the Opium Wars was used as an example 
by the U.S. envoy to warn Japan of the dangers of angering Western powers. Once the 
most vibrant civilization on earth, China’s desire to return to its status as a great power is 
a central part of Beijing’s present security agenda.364 One reason that Taiwan figures so 
high within Beijing’s strategic calculus is that recovering the island represents the 
symbolic ending of China’s “century of humiliation.”365 As China drives to overcome 
decades of humiliation at the hands of the West, the development of a strong navy is seen 
as a central component expressing China’s rightful and natural greatness.  
b. Differences  
Key differences between China’s current situation and the historical cases 
of Imperial Japan and the Second Reich include the structure of the modern global 
economy, the ideational shift away from belief in China’s cultural dominance, and the 
size of the PLAN’s expansion. These differences, which are specific to China’s situation, 
present mitigating factors that may alleviate rising regional security tensions. 
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Modern China differs from Imperial Japan in an important way; China is 
not seeking economic autarky. Although securing energy resources is a central concern 
for Beijing, China is not nearly as dependent on foreign energy resources as Japan. 
Japan’s military expansion was in part due to its extreme reliance on overseas resource 
access; barring faith in the market, force would have to guarantee access. While overseas 
resource access is important to Beijing, it is not a matter of national survival.366 
Therefore, Beijing’s desire to build a navy to secure resource access is not as pressing as 
the need of Imperial Japan.  
Compared to Imperial Germany, modern China shares the need to utilize 
export markets to sell excess manufactured goods. However, China has little need of 
colonies to ensure export sales; and such arrangements would not be tolerated by the 
current global system in any case. Instead, modern China has worked diligently to 
integrate itself into the international economic system. Any impetus on the part of Beijing 
to strive for economic autarky would be blunted by the very nature of what has enabled 
China’s economic growth – the sale of export goods within the globalized free market 
system. China needs other countries for its own benefit. As former Chinese leader Deng 
Xiaopeng noted, “no country can now develop by closing its door…Isolation landed 
China in poverty backwardness, and ignorance.”367  Under current conditions, “autarky” 
is virtually synonymous with under-development. 
Finally, it is important to note the most pertinent distinction that exists 
between modern China and the historical case studies – the military budget. The naval 
arms races initiated by the funding of ship construction by Germany and Japan 
represented distinct breaks from historic spending levels. As previously outlined, Chinese 
defense spending has not notably increased as a percentage of overall government 
spending, or as a share of total national wealth. Using DIA estimates of the PLA’s budget 
and estimating that the PLAN receives one-third of the PLA’s budget, the PLAN’s 2007 
defense budget equaled between $28.3 to $41.7 billion USD. When compared to the 
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USN’s 2007 budget of $127.3 billion USD, the PLAN simply cannot compete with the 
USN for fleet funding. The 17.8 percent increase of the 2007 PLA budget over the year 
before, while higher than normal, provides little cause for concern.Even a doubling of 
China’s budget would not equate to a navy on par with the USN, unless it was persisted 
in for decades, during which the United States would of course have ample opportunity to 
respond. Instead, China’s blue-water ambitions have been focused on foreign ship 
purchases and the development of destroyers and frigates that are providing China with a 
rudimentary offshore capability. China has focused its naval spending on submarines for 
a specific reason; submarines best serve an inferior power. Unlike Imperial Japan and 
Imperial Germany, China recognizes that it is the less capable power and apparently does 
not aspire to challenge the naval superiority of the regionally dominant power – the 
United States. As it is unable to afford a fleet that could challenge the USN, Beijing has 
prudently chosen not to try to build a fleet to challenge the USN.   
c. Summary  
Overall, an analysis of the growth of the Imperial Japanese Navy and the 
Imperial German Navy provide several broad themes that lend insight into the growth of 
the PLAN. While China’s current naval building is of little immediate concern, Beijing’s 
lack of disclosure to account for the motivation behind its military growth raises 
questions in Washington regarding Beijing’s strategic intent. Finally, although certain 
policy-makers and analysts within Beijing have expressed concern over China’s 
economic dependence on foreign resources and markets, China’s current integration into 
world markets serves to mitigate any attempts to move towards autarky. Contemporary 
China does not present the same type of threat to the United States that Japan and 
Germany presented to the hegemonic powers of their day.  
B. THE FUTURE OF ASIAN SECURITY STABILITY  
China wishes to return to great power status. Implicit in that desire is Beijing’s 
dissatisfaction with the current unipolar system in which the United States is the 
 113
dominant power.368 Nevertheless, the naval modernization of the PLAN is a solid 
indicator that Beijing’s desire to transform the East Asian region into a multipolar region 
is not a driving force in Beijing’s foreign policy. Beijing’s current funding for the PLAN 
is not enough to challenge the strength of the USN where international power interacts 
most freely – the sea. Instead of a strong emphasis on replacing what Beijing perceives as 
the regional hegemon, Beijing is highly focused on continuing economic development in 
order to maintain social cohesion and the rule of the Chinese Communist Party.369  
Another important tool in maintaining China’s social cohesion has to do with 
sovereignty. In the service of sovereignty, China has developed its military to address its 
most pressing strategic issue – Taiwan. The PLAN has specifically been developed 
around the problem of Taiwan. Although “active defense” presents a doctrine that 
outlines how China can extend its maritime geographic reach, the naval forces Beijing 
has developed to date are unable to fulfill the requirements of controlling the seas out to 
the “first” and “second” island chains. Instead, near-shore defense and offshore 
harassment are the hallmarks of a Chinese navy designed around submarines, shore-based 
fighter and bomber aircraft, and a limited blue-water capability.  
For the United States, it is imperative that China’s legitimate interests are 
recognized as valid. Debates over containment and engagement by Washington towards 
Beijing are moot.  The former is simply not feasible, while the latter has already 
occurred.370  As a member of the United Nations and World Trade Organization, it can 
easily be argued that China is already very much engaged. Over the past thirty years, 
China’s strength has grown considerably. At the same time, the threat that China poses to 
American interests, including the USN, must not be overstated.  The perceived challenge 
of China to U.S. dominance in the region is not an excuse for bellicosity and panic.  
While Taiwan presents unique diplomatic challenges, the economic concern of China is a 
strategic problem that the United States can appreciate. Washington should work to 
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encourage China’s economic development and growth, but should not forget that 
economic interdependence does not mean an end to the struggle for strength amongst 
nations. In the words of international relations theorist Robert Gilpin, “Trade has not 
always proved to be a force for peace.”371 
Ultimately, the role of the PLAN in East Asian security is one that serves to warn 
others away from China’s coast. In China’s eyes, that coast includes Taiwan. While 
outclassed by the USN, the PLAN hopes its sea-denial forces would either threaten or 
inflict enough damage on any force approaching China that the force would turn away.372 
Although China’s long-term interests are to secure its SLOCs and offshore claims, for the 
foreseeable future, the PLAN will not be able to fully enforce those interests. Instead, 
China will continue to rely on its diplomatic and economic efforts, efforts such as the 
“string of pearls,” while reluctantly utilizing the USN to ensure that sea-lanes are 
secured.373  
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE UNITED 
STATES NAVY 
Due to the PLAN’s historically limited development and China’s assessment of 
the USN’s carrier-based maritime dominance, recent growth of the PLAN has focused 
primarily on the development of an anti-access submarine force.374 China’s defense 
establishment recognizes that the PLAN’s ambitions should focus on a limited force of 
high quality that is capable of winning technologically advanced and limited wars at 
sea.375 A modern submarine force is the ideal means by which Beijing can meet its 
objective. Such a force is intended to deter the USN’s movement near China’s coast, 
most notably in the case of a Taiwan crisis. Based on both a PLAN submarine force’s 
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potential threat to U.S. surface assets and the likely damage of any attack to American  
prestige, the PLAN’s growth presents a challenge to U.S. strategic interests in the 
Western Pacific.376 To the USN’s advantage, the growth of China’s submarine force has 
been limited.  
The response of the United States must be carefully planned and implemented. 
Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Susan Shirk notes that, “Historically, rising 
powers cause war not necessarily because they are belligerent, but because the reigning 
powers mishandle those who challenge the status quo…”377 For the United States, 
overreaction to China’s limited growth could exasperate bilateral tensions. Practical 
reactions to China’s growing submarine growth should be limited. The U.S. Pacific Fleet 
has recently included 46 to 50 percent of the USN’s attack submarines and 45 to 48 
percent of its surface combatants. An increase of the Pacific Fleet’s share of USN assets 
by five to ten percent would result in another three to five submarines and five to ten 
surface combatants.378 The limited increase in force structure would allow for more USN 
assets in the Western Pacific, a move that could signal Washington’s resolve in 
maintaining U.S. interests in the region. Qualitatively, the USN should focus on the 
competency of its current anti-submarine warfare (ASW) platforms. The prudent counter 
to an identified submarine threat is to improve ASW capabilities. Overall, the United 
States should be cautious not to parade its superior military strength.379 China is well 
aware of the USN’s dominance over the PLAN; the developmental plan of the PLAN 
assumes its inferior strength and seeks to achieve limited gains in the direction of parity. 
Along with being careful to not flaunt the dominance of the USN, Washington 
must ensure that it clearly signals the rationale behind force structure modifications 
within East Asia and the Pacific.380 Poor signaling has been a key characteristic in the 
escalation of past naval arms races. If the USN increases its Pacific Fleet force presence, 
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outlining its reasons for the increase may serve to partially mitigate Beijing’s concerns. 
Exchanges between the PLAN and USN, to include strategic dialogues, educational 
exchanges, and, potentially, force interactions, are a key method of improving the 
signaling of Washington’s intent and interests to Beijing.381 Through an improved 
exchange process, the United States can also provide China a useful service. Beijing’s 
strategic choices will induce effects from Washington; frequent interaction between 
PLAN and USN personnel, particularly senior officers, can indicate Washington’s 
potential responses to Beijing’s choices.382 The ideal message that Washington can 
provide to Beijing is the USN’s desire to ensure the free movement of trade and energy 
on the high seas. If anything, the USN prefers Corbett’s concept of sea control, one more 
focused on the sea as a medium of transit and less alarming than Mahan’s ideal of 
outright “command”.383 Corbett explains: 
Command of the sea, therefore, means nothing but the control of maritime 
communications, whether for commercial or military purposes. The object 
of naval warfare is the control of communications, and not, as in land 
warfare, the conquest of territory.384 
The USN is interested in the movement of trade across the sea, not absolute 
control of its use. A confirmation of the USN’s interest in the free movement of trade is 
highlighted in the USN’s most recent explication of its maritime strategy, A Cooperative 
Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.385  
In the end, maritime security concerns justify China’s development of a modern 
PLAN that protects China’s national interests.386 China’s foremost emerging maritime 
security concern is the free movement of energy resources via vital SLOCs. To Beijing’s 
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disappointment, China’s naval modernization does not fully ensure its maritime interests. 
To date, the PLAN’s growth cannot fully guarantee the security of China’s extensive and 
growing trade and resource requirements. Whatever China’s attempts to improve its 
navy, in the near-term, Beijing must rely on its developing influence via diplomatic and 
economic efforts such as the “string of pearls” policy to increase its maritime 
comprehensive national power. In conjunction with non-military means of guaranteeing 
sea trade, China must continue to rely upon the United States to militarily secure the vital  
sea lanes that feed China’s ravenous economy.387 As navy budgets increase with 
improved technology, the unchanged responsibilities of maritime security must rely more 
and more upon multinational maritime strategies.388 The growth of navies has historically 
indicated a turn towards conflict; the United States and China have a unique opportunity 
to identify shared maritime concerns in order to diffuse conflict before it commences.  
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